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Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications 
Iowa Utilities and Verizon 
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker* 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires, among other things, 
that incumbent local telephone carriers lease parts of their telephone 
networks to would-be rivals.1 If you have children, you can easily imag-
ine the difficulties inherent in this approach; mandated sharing is often 
contentious when forced upon young kids and is no easier as applied to 
firms with strong, contradictory interests. These problems are exacer-
bated in the telecommunications setting by imprecision in the rules of 
the game. As Justice Scalia put it AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,2  
“[i]t would be gross understatement to say that the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a 
model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”3 
However complicated the legal provisions, the intuition behind 
them is straightforward: the purpose of mandatory sharing is to facilitate 
competition. Without mandatory sharing, a competitor can enter the 
market only if it can either cut a deal with an existing telephone com-
pany or build its own network from the ground up. With mandatory 
sharing, by contrast, a competitor has a third option: it can enter the 
                                                       
* Copyright © 2002, Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Respec-
tively, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School; and Paul and Theo Leffmann 
Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow, The 
Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. We 
thank the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at The University of Chicago Law 
School for its generous research support, and, through their support of the Olin Program, 
Merck & Co., Inc.; Microsoft Corp.; and Pfizer, Inc. We also thank Stuart Benjamin, Richard 
Epstein, Howard Shelanski, and Jim Speta for helpful comments, Pat Curran for research 
assistance, and participants in a workshop sponsored by the Manhattan Institute’s Center for 
the Digital Economy and entitled “Competition Policy in the Telecom Industry: When the 
Sherman Act Meets the Telecommunications Act, Who Wins?”.  
1 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), §§ 251-52, as 
codified at 47 USC §§ 251–52 (2002). 
2 525 US 366 (1999). 
3 Id at 397. 
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market in stages, building part of its network itself but then leasing the 
rest at regulated rates from existing firms. The competitor can later 
choose to build out its network more fully, for example if its original 
offering has helped it to establish market share, to develop some relevant 
expertise, or to accumulate necessary financial resources. Alternatively, 
the competitor can continue to compete along only the narrower dimen-
sion, borrowing most network elements from the incumbent and in that 
way focusing its competitive energies on some small subset of the rele-
vant infrastructure. 
The mandatory sharing provisions of the 1996 Act have generated a 
flood of litigation in the past six years, in part because these provisions 
represent a sweeping change in the regulatory landscape. Prior to 1996, 
local telephone regulation had proceeded under the assumption that 
each community should be served by one and only one local telephone 
carrier. That carrier was subject to regulation so as to ensure that its 
prices remained low and the quality of its service remained high. But 
competition was not encouraged. It was expensive enough to have one 
firm build a local telephone network connecting every home and busi-
ness in the community; policymakers deemed it ridiculous to encourage 
a second or third firm to duplicate that infrastructure. 
The 1996 Act turned this conventional wisdom on its head. Gone 
was the assumption that regulated monopoly is the best approach to 
local telephone service. Replacing it was a firm commitment to competi-
tion. That commitment reveals itself throughout the 1996 Act, for ex-
ample in a provision requiring that existing telephone carriers exchange 
traffic with new entrants,4 and in a provision forbidding state authorities 
from adopting regulations that favor one local telephone company at the 
expense of another.5 But the central and most controversial pro-
competitive provisions of the 1996 Act are those that create the above-
described regime of mandatory shared infrastructure. Insiders term these 
the “unbundled network element” (UNE) provisions; and twice already 
these provisions have been subject to Supreme Court review. 
In the first case, the aforementioned Iowa Utilities, the Court con-
sidered whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had 
                                                       
4 47 USC § 251(c)(2). 
5 47 USC § 253 (2002). 
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been faithful to the 1996 Act when it promulgated a regulation identify-
ing the specific network elements that an incumbent telephone company 
has to share with rival firms.6 The incumbent firms argued that the 
Commission had applied too lax a standard. According to them, the 
right standard would have required sharing only if a given element was 
an “essential facility” as that phrase is used in antitrust law.7 The Court 
rejected this argument on grounds that a telecom-specific standard 
might better accomplish the 1996 Act’s goals. But the Court did find 
that “the Act requires the FCC to apply some limiting standard”—
something the Commission, in the eyes of the Court, had “simply failed 
to do.”8 
The Court’s specific criticisms centered on the Commission’s inter-
pretation of section 251(d)(2), a provision that instructs the Commis-
sion to “consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network 
elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to 
provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the 
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it 
seeks to offer.”9 According to the Court, the Commission eviscerated 
the first of these criteria by interpreting it “as having been met regardless 
of whether ‘requesting carriers can obtain the requested proprietary ele-
ment from a source other than the incumbent’”10 and similarly eviscer-
ated the second by deeming competition impaired if “the failure of an 
incumbent to provide access to [some specific] network element would 
decrease the quality, or increase the financial or administrative cost of 
the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer, compared with providing 
                                                       
6 Iowa Utilities addressed other issues as well, including jurisdictional questions about whether 
the Act empowers the federal government, through the Federal Communications Commission, 
or state government, through local public utilities commissions, to take the lead in coordinating 
various aspects of mandatory sharing. We do not focus on the jurisdictional issues in this Arti-
cle, but interested readers are invited to consult Stuart Benjamin, Douglas Lichtman and How-
ard Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 731-35 (Carolina, 2001) (“Telecommunica-
tions Law & Policy”). 
7 525 US at 388. 
8 Id. 
9 47 USC § 251(d)(2). 
10 525 US at 389, quoting FCC, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (“First Report & Order”) at ¶ 283. 
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that service over other unbundled elements.”11 The Court therefore va-
cated the Commission’s rule as unreasonable under even the generous 
standards of Chevron deference.12 
The second case, last Term’s Verizon Communications v. Federal 
Communications Commission,13 raised two primary objections to the pro-
cedure that the Commission had established for determining the price at 
which various network elements will be made available for mandatory 
sharing. The first objection was that the Commission’s procedure did 
not sufficiently track the relevant statutory language. The 1996 Act does 
not say much about prices, but it does say that a “just and reasonable 
rate” should be “based on the cost” of the shared facility, should be 
“nondiscriminatory,” and “may include a reasonable profit.”14 The in-
cumbent local telephone carriers argued that the Commission’s rule did 
not satisfy these commands, the objection being that the Commission’s 
approach—a forward-looking cost methodology known as “total ele-
ment long-run incremental cost” or TELRIC—was not “based on cost” 
because, among other things, it defined cost to mean the expense that 
would be incurred were an equivalent network built today instead of 
adopting the arguably more conventional definition that cost means ac-
tual monies spent.15 The Court ultimately found that the Commission’s 
interpretation was reasonable on this score, or, less enthusiastically, that 
it was “reasonably within the pale of statutory possibility.”16 
The incumbents’ second objection was that the Commission’s pric-
ing methodology, if deemed permissible under the statute, would result 
in regulated prices so low as to constitute a taking of the incumbents’ 
property without just compensation, a violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. This, the incumbents argued, justified application 
                                                       
11 525 US at 389 (italics omitted), quoting First Report & Order at ¶ 285 (cited in note 10). 
12 Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). The Com-
mission rewrote its rules after the remand, with no more success. See United States Telecom Ass’n 
v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC Cir 2002). 
13 122 S Ct 1646 (2002). 
14 47 USC § 252(d). 
15 47 CFR § 51.505 (1997). 
16 122 S Ct at 1687. 
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of the rule of constitutional avoidance; in essence, the Court should in-
terpret the 1996 Act to preclude the Commission’s pricing methodology 
in order to avoid a serious constitutional question. The Court was not 
convinced that a serious constitutional question was in the offing, how-
ever, mainly because the Commission’s pricing methodology is so flexi-
ble that, even knowing what it is, it is still almost impossible to guess 
whether the resulting prices will be high or low, let alone so unconstitu-
tionally low as to set up a possible takings argument.17 The Court noted 
that this conclusion was consistent with its “general rule” of not consid-
ering “a taking challenge on ratesetting methodology without being pre-
sented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory.”18 
This account covers a great deal of law and policy, and obviously we 
will unpack it with care below. But before we delve too deeply into that 
analysis, we should make clear that we think the Commission in prom-
ulgating the regulations at issue in these two cases, and the Court in 
analyzing those regulations in light of both the 1996 Act and the Con-
stitution, performed admirably. The 1996 Act gave the Commission 
only six months to promulgate all of the regulations needed to imple-
ment network element unbundling.19 Viewed in that light, the rules that 
the Commission produced20 and the document that attempts to explain 
and justify them21 represent a substantial accomplishment. Similarly, 
while we think that the Court made some missteps in Iowa Utilities and 
Verizon, overall the Court’s analysis in both of these cases strikes us rea-
sonable and likely even right. The economic issues at the core of these 
cases were complicated and at times ambiguous; and the Court in our 
view exercised good judgment in deciding when to wade into the morass 
and when to defer technical issues to the Commission. 
 Our purpose in this Article, then, is not to criticize either the 
Commission or the Court. Instead, we set out here to move the analysis 
                                                       
17 Id at 1679. 
18 Id. 
19 47 USC § 251(d)(1). 
20 See, in particular, 47 CFR § 51.317 (1997) (standards for identifying network elements to 
be made available); 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997) (specific unbundling requirements); 47 CFR 
§§ 51.501-51.515 (2002) (establishing pricing rules for unbundled network elements). 
21 First Report & Order (cited in note 10). 
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forward by highlighting some possible mistakes, raising some over-
looked issues, and along the way clarifying exactly what is at stake in 
these battles over the form and substance of the 1996 Act’s unbundling 
regime. Our hope is that the ideas presented here will amount to more 
than just a post-mortem on two interesting and important Supreme 
Court cases. Indeed, we hope that our discussion helps to inform the 
on-going legal and regulatory process put in motion by these cases and 
still underway at the Commission and in, among others, the Second, 
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.22 
We proceed as follows. In Section I, we explain the key sharing 
rules established by the 1996 Act and parse in some detail the Court’s 
analysis of those rules in Iowa Utilities and Verizon. In Section II, we 
consider more conceptually the main reasons why sharing rules are 
sometimes imposed in markets like the market for local telephone ser-
vice, focusing in particular on the problem of natural monopoly and its 
implications for both market entry and government regulation. In Sec-
tion III, we point out the three main differences between the sharing 
rules promulgated under the 1996 Act and the rules that were in place 
prior to 1996. In Section IV, we present some data on how all this regu-
lation has begun to unfold in practice. Finally, in Section V, we use the 
preceding analysis to look forward from Iowa Utilities and Verizon, of-
fering our thoughts on how these cases will influence the regulatory and 
legal landscape in the coming years. 
I. Iowa Utilities and Verizon 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is wide-ranging, but among its 
most important provisions are those designed, in the FCC’s words, “to 
let anyone enter any communications business—to let any communica-
tions business compete in any market against any other.”23 This might 
                                                       
22 See, for example, Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 757 (8th Cir 2000) (continued 
proceedings in light of Iowa Utilities); United States Telecom Ass’n. v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC 
Cir 2002) (judicial review of the Commission’s revised list of elements to be unbundled); 
Goldwasser v Ameritech Corp., 222 F3d 390 (7th Cir 2000) (analysis of relationship between the 
unbundling requirements and federal antitrust law); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v Bell Atlan-
tic Corp., 305 F3d 89 (2nd Cir 2002) (same). 
23 See FCC, Telecommunications Act of 1996, available online at 
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sound like an obvious objective; but in the early days of telecommunica-
tions regulation, competition was in fact restricted in telecommunica-
tions markets for fear that it would mean wasteful duplication of tele-
communications resources and, worse, the possibility of competing but 
incompatible telephone networks.24  
Granted, that view had lost some ground even before the 1996 Act. 
In the 1950’s, for example, the Commission embraced competition by 
authorizing the use of telephone handsets purchased in the marketplace, 
rejecting the earlier view that telephone handsets were part of the tele-
phone network and thus had to be rented from the telephone company 
itself.25 Similarly, in the 1980’s, the Commission joined forces with the 
Department of Justice and used a combination of regulation and anti-
trust litigation to open the long distance market to competition, this 
time by requiring local telephone companies to work with all the various 
long distance firms instead of each just picking a favored partner.26 
But the market for local telephone service had been left untouched 
by these and related changes. Simply put, it was expensive to build a 
fully functional local telephone network, and having a single network 
sufficed in terms of being able to provide adequate service to every inter-
ested home and business. Given that, policymakers saw little reason to 
encourage the construction of a second or third overlapping infrastruc-
ture. The 1996 Act thus represented a significant shift in telecommuni-
cations policy. The new goal was to encourage competition even in the 
local market, at least to whatever extent the economics of the industry 
would allow.  
                                                                                                                     
<http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html> (visited November 1, 2002). 
24 See Telecommunications Law & Policy at 614-21 (cited in note 6). It is possible that in-
compatible local telephone networks would benefit society by spurring innovation and encour-
aging quality service. See Milton L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, 
and Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System (MIT & AEI, 1997). 
25 See Hush-A-Phone v United States, 238 F2d 266 (DC Cir 1956); Use of the Carterfone Device 
in Message Toll Service, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968); Use of Recording Devices in Connection with 
Telephone Services, 11 FCC 1033 (1947). For discussion, see Telecommunications Law & Pol-
icy at 624-28 (cited in note 6). 
26 See United States v American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F Supp 131 (DC Cir 1982), aff’d, 
460 US 1001 (1983); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure Phase III, 100 FCC 2d 860 
(1985). For discussion, see Glen Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing 
World of Telecommunications, 5 Yale J Reg 517 (1988). 
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Some of the 1996 Act’s mechanisms for encouraging competition 
are easy to understand. One set of provisions, for instance, obligates all 
existing telecommunications carriers to exchange traffic with each other 
and with any new entrants.27 This is important since a new entrant—a 
“competitive local exchange carrier” or CLEC in telecommunications 
jargon—can attract customers only if it can guarantee that its subscribers 
will be able to communicate with existing telephone users. Another set 
of provisions facilitates competition by allowing a CLEC to resell under 
its own name services that are in fact provided by another firm.28 This 
makes it easy for a new firm to enter the market, especially since services 
can be purchased at cheap “wholesale rates” if purchased from an “in-
cumbent local exchange carrier” (ILEC)—telecom-speak for a local 
telephone company that was already in business at the time the 1996 
Act took effect.29 
The most important mechanism, however—and the one of most in-
terest in both Iowa Utilities and Verizon—requires incumbent local tele-
phone carriers to share, at regulated rates and with any interested firm, 
certain components used in their networks. For example, suppose that 
the existing local telephone network in a given community uses copper 
wires to connect local homes to some centralized automatic switch. Un-
der the 1996 Act, the ILEC that owns those wires must allow any inter-
ested competitor to use them. The idea is to give new entrants the op-
portunity to enter the market without requiring that each entrant build 
its own entire telecom network right from the start. Using unbundled 
network elements, firms can enter the market gradually, providing some 
network elements on their own but leasing the rest from the relevant 
incumbent firm. 
The 1996 Act only sketches the rough contours of this unbundled 
network element mechanism. Indeed, as we have mentioned, one critical 
provision sets out the standards that the Commission should use when 
                                                       
27 See 47 USC § 251(a)(1) (general obligation of interconnection); 47 USC § 251(c)(2) (more 
detailed interconnection obligation for incumbents). For discussion, see Telecommunications 
Law & Policy at 715-18 (cited in note 6). 
28 See 47 USC § 251(b)(1) (resale obligation for all firms); 47 USC § 251(c)(4) (specific obli-
gation for incumbents). 
29 See 47 USC § 252(d)(3) (defining wholesale rates for purposes of § 251(c)(4)). 
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deciding which network elements must be made available for lease, but 
that provision states only that the Commission should “consider, at a 
minimum, whether access to such network elements as are proprietary in 
nature is necessary” and also whether “the failure to provide access . . . 
would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking ac-
cess to provide the services it seeks to offer.”30 Another central but 
vague provision is the pricing provision also mentioned earlier, which 
states in relevant part that the price should be “based on the cost” of the 
relevant network element and “may include a reasonable profit.”31  
All that left much of the hard work to the Federal Communications 
Commission, as it was to promulgate the rules that would implement 
these ambiguous and complicated provisions. And for all of the uncer-
tainty about how to actually read the Act, Congress left no doubt as to 
when the FCC was to complete its work implementing the core sharing 
rules; the 1996 Act required that the Commission issue the relevant im-
plementing regulations within six months of the statute’s enactment.32 
Somewhat miraculously given the enormity of the task, the FCC met 
the deadline, issuing the relevant regulations on August 8, 1996.33 The 
litigation that ultimately led to both Supreme Court challenges began 
shortly thereafter. 
A. Iowa Utilities 
One of the main issues in contention in Iowa Utilities was the question 
of whether the Commission exercised reasonable discretion when it 
promulgated a rule identifying seven specific network elements that 
every incumbent would have to unbundle.34 Incumbent local exchange 
carriers argued that the Commission had applied too lenient a standard 
when identifying those seven elements. For example, the incumbents 
argued that the Commission had not adequately considered the possibil-
ity that entrants can purchase some elements through voluntary transac-
                                                       
30 47 USC § 251(d)(2). 
31 47 USC § 252(d). 
32 47 USC § 251(d)(1). 
33 See First Report and Order (cited in note 10). 
34 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997). 
Lichtman & Picker Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications 10 
 
tions, a consideration that might argue against mandatory unbundling 
with respect to those elements. The Court was largely receptive to these 
challenges and ultimately vacated the challenged rule; but, before we 
explain why, it might be helpful to first set out and analyze the relevant 
legal provisions, namely sections 251(c)(3) and 251(d)(2) of the 1996 
Act. 
Section 251(c)(3) sets forth the basic requirement that incumbent 
local exchange carriers  “provide, to any requesting telecommunications 
carrier . . . access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any 
technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”35 When Iowa Utilities was litigated 
in the Eighth Circuit, there was some dispute over what the phrase “at 
any technically feasible point” means.36 The Commission thought that 
the phrase creates a presumption that every element should be unbun-
dled so long as unbundling is technically feasible.37 Incumbent carriers 
thought that the phrase merely defines where—namely, at technically 
feasible points—unbundling should take place.38 The Eighth Circuit 
ultimately sided with the incumbents39 and the Commission did not 
challenge that decision in the Supreme Court,40 and thus today the ac-
cepted reading of section 251(c)(3) is that it creates a general unbun-
dling obligation without in any way specifying exactly what should be 
unbundled.41 
                                                       
35 47 USC § 251(c)(3). 
36 Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 120 F3d 753, 810 (8th Cir 1997). 
37 525 US at 391. 
38 Id. 
39 120 F3d at 810. 
40 525 US at 391. 
41 Note that the Supreme Court could have vacated and remanded the Commission’s unbun-
dling rules on this ground alone. The argument would have been that the Commission’s admit-
ted error in interpreting section 251(c)(3) infected all of its regulations; in essence, the Com-
mission had started the process with a presumption in favor of unbundling and then looked for 
reasons not to unbundle instead of starting with a blank slate and looking for reasons to un-
bundle. The Court did not vacate on this ground, however, perhaps out of a suspicion that the 
two approaches in the end lead to the same basic results. This conclusion is bolstered by a 
comparison of the Commission’s original list of elements (47 CFR § 51.319 (1997)) with the 
nearly identical list put forward on remand (47 CFR § 51.319 (2002)). 
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Section 251(d)(2), by contrast, offers guidance as to which elements 
should be included in the unbundling regime. Specifically, the provision 
instructs the Commission to “consider, at a minimum, whether (A) ac-
cess to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; 
and (B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would 
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to 
provide the services that it seeks to offer.”42 One way to think about this 
provision is to see it as setting up a two-level standard: for elements that 
involve some form of intellectual property, the Commission should ask 
whether unbundling is “necessary,” whereas for non-proprietary ele-
ments the Commission should ask only whether a decision not to un-
bundle would somehow “impair” competition. Phrased another way, 
Congress in this provision seems to be telling the Commission to be 
especially reluctant to unbundle elements where patent, copyright, 
trademark or trade secret protection is implicated—more reluctant than 
the Commission would be under its normal, baseline standard. 
But what is that baseline? Try three different formulations, all 
seemingly consistent with the vague contours of section 251(d)(2). In 
the first, the baseline for unbundling is that we should unbundle only in 
instances where it is physically or economically impractical for an en-
trant to provide a given element itself or to acquire that element through 
voluntary market transactions. This would be a relatively strict standard, 
in that it would roughly shadow antitrust law’s essential facilities doc-
trine and thus would favor unbundling only in extreme situations. That 
might make sense; and, indeed, the incumbents pushed for this interpre-
tation in the Supreme Court.43 However, as we will see in a moment, 
there are arguments in favor of mandatory access even in cases where 
self-provision or voluntary transactions are plausible. 
Try, then, a second formulation, namely that we should unbundle 
even in cases where entry would otherwise be possible, the purpose be-
ing either to make it easier for firms to enter the market or to accelerate 
entry into the market. The Commission was clearly sympathetic to at 
least this latter idea of accelerating entry. In fact, at one point in the 
document explaining its unbundling regulations, the Commission ex-
                                                       
42 47 USC § 251(d)(2). 
43 525 US at 388. 
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plicitly stated that while “it is possible that there will be sufficient de-
mand in some local telephone markets to support the construction of 
competing local exchange facilities” at some point, those future com-
petitors should “be able to use unbundled elements from the incumbent 
[local exchange carriers] until such time as they complete construction 
of their own networks.”44 Note that this articulation seems to let the 
entrants determine when any transition takes place, although one could 
easily imagine an alternative articulation where unbundling was an op-
tion only for a predefined transition period. 
Consider, finally, a third formulation, namely that we should un-
bundle in instances where new entrants would otherwise provide their 
own elements but those duplicative elements would represent social 
waste. This interpretation harkens back to the old regulatory notion that 
it is expensive to build certain parts of the local telephone network and it 
is therefore ridiculous to encourage firms to duplicate that infrastruc-
ture. Unbundling on this view is necessary not because a given entrant 
would not build its own facility, but rather because it would be socially 
wasteful to have a second facility built. On this story, mandatory ac-
cess—at sufficiently cheap prices—is a means by which to avoid the 
needless duplication of facilities. 
Again, section 251(d)(2) does not on its face dictate any particular 
choice among these three formulations. And, in fact, the record suggests 
that in some form the Commission thought about each of these articula-
tions when crafting its unbundling rules.45 The question in Iowa Utili-
ties was therefore whether, in the end, that thought process was suffi-
cient; or, more specifically, whether the Commission had reasonably 
interpreted Congress’s command that it “consider” whether access to 
proprietary elements was necessary and whether the failure to provide 
                                                       
44 First Report & Order at ¶ 232 (cited in note 10). 
45 See, for example, id at ¶ 286 (refusing to hold that incumbents “must provide unbundled 
elements only when the failure to do so would prevent a carrier from offering a service,” thus 
considering and rejecting the first articulation given in the text); id at ¶ 378 (noting that the 
failure to unbundle a given element “would likely delay market entry and postpone the benefits 
of local telephone competition for consumers,” the issues raised in our second articulation); and 
id (noting that, in some instances, “preventing access to unbundled loops would . . . cause the 
competitor to construct unnecessarily duplicative facilities, thereby misallocating societal re-
sources,” our third concern). 
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access to non-proprietary elements would impair a given entrant’s ability 
to offer a particular telecommunications service. 
Focus first on the direct command issued to the Commission, 
namely that it consider the two factors at issue. The most natural inter-
pretation of “consider” is just that: were the necessity and impair factors 
thought about in defining the unbundling standards? So long as they 
were—as they almost certainly were—the regulations would pass mus-
ter. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly how the Commission understood its 
obligation under section 251(d)(2), concluding that “the word ‘consider’ 
means we must weigh the standards enumerated in section 251(d)(2) in 
evaluating whether to require the unbundling of a particular element”46 
and, later, that “the plain language of section 251(d)(2), and the stan-
dards articulated there, give us the discretion to limit the general obliga-
tion imposed by subsection 251(c)(3), but they do not require us to do 
so.”47 
Arguably, this was a reasonable interpretation of the law. After all, 
Congress does from time to time order administrative agencies to in-
clude certain considerations in their deliberations. For example, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act requires that federal agencies give envi-
ronmental concerns “appropriate consideration in decisionmaking,” but 
that Act does not itself impose any substantive standard on actual out-
comes.48 Moreover, the “shall consider” formulation is used more than a 
dozen times in federal communications laws,49 and in at least some of 
those instances courts have interpreted the phrase to mean exactly what 
the Commission says it meant here.50  
                                                       
46 Id at ¶ 280. 
47 Id at ¶ 286. 
48 42 USC § 4332 (2002). See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v Karlen, 444 US 223 
(1980). 
49 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 154(a)(3), 160(b), 226(e)(2), 227(b)(2), 251(d)(2), 254(c)(1), 
273(e)(1)(A), 311(b), 325(b)(3)(A), 332(a), 332(c)(1)(C), 534(g)(2), 543(c)(2), 544a(c)(1), 
548(c)(4), 610(b)(3) (2002). 
50 In a dispute over cable television rates, for example, the D.C. Circuit noted that the relevant 
statute “by its terms merely requires the Commission to consider” several relevant factors. The 
court went on to say that this means only that the Commission must “reach an express and 
considered conclusion about the bearing of [each] factor, but is not required to give any specific 
weight” to those factors. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v FCC, 56 F3d 151, 175 (DC Cir 
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The Commission pressed this argument—that it need only consider 
necessity and impairment and that it had done so—in the Supreme 
Court,51 but the Court’s decision does not explicitly address it. We must 
admit that we are a little puzzled by that. The argument seems strong 
enough to warrant serious discussion, especially given the fact that, if 
accepted, it would leave the Commission’s rule fully intact, a result di-
rectly opposite the one ultimately reached in the case. The best defense 
of what the Court did would be to say that the Commission’s interpreta-
tions of the necessary and impair standards were so misguided that the 
Commission cannot fairly be said to have considered these factors. That 
would explain why the Court went ahead and analyzed the substance of 
the Commission’s interpretations; and it is to that substance that we 
now turn. 
The Court raised two fundamental concerns about the Commis-
sion’s interpretations. The first was that, in the Court’s view, the Com-
mission had ignored the possibility that some elements can be obtained 
in the market or built by would-be entrants. As we have already ex-
plained, it might make sense to unbundle even if a given element can be 
built anew or acquired through voluntary transactions; for instance, the 
purpose of unbundling might be to discourage wasteful duplication by 
offering entrants cheap access to existing infrastructure. But the ques-
tion of whether a given element can be acquired through voluntary 
transactions or built anew is certainly relevant to the section 251(d)(2) 
inquiry. The Court was therefore troubled by what it perceived as a 
Commission completely insensitive to these possibilities. 
In truth, the evidence on this point was mixed. Yes, when the 
Commission announced its interpretation of the “necessary” standard, 
the Commission did say that a proprietary element is necessary unless 
the “requesting telecommunications carrier could offer the same pro-
posed telecommunications service through the use of other, nonproprietary 
unbundled network elements” borrowed from the incumbent’s network.52 
                                                                                                                     
1995) (interpreting 47 USC § 543(c)(2)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
51 See Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners and Brief for the Federal Cross-Respondents at 43-44 
(“Reply Brief”) (available on Lexis). 
52 47 CFR § 51.317 (1997) (emphasis added). This quotation is taken from Rule 317, a rule 
that was promulgated alongside the rule explicitly at issue in Iowa Utilities, Rule 319. Rule 317 
instructed state commissions in how to interpret the necessary and impair standard in the event 
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That comparison captures what the Court saw as the Commission’s er-
ror; it compares the incumbent’s unbundled proprietary elements to the 
incumbent’s unbundled non-proprietary elements, completely ignoring 
elements not borrowed from the incumbent at all. Similarly, in inter-
preting the statutory language about impairment, the Commission held 
that a requesting carrier would be impaired in its ability to provide a 
given service if “the failure of an incumbent to provide access to a net-
work element would decrease the quality, or increase the financial or 
administrative cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer, com-
pared with providing that service over other unbundled elements” borrowed 
from the incumbent’s network.53 Again, same problem: this articulation 
compares unbundled elements to unbundled elements, failing to account 
for elements that might be acquired outside the unbundling regime. 
In the Commission’s defense, however, it is unfair to read too much 
into those quotations. The Commission obviously did think about the 
possibility that entrants would build elements themselves or purchase 
elements in voluntary transactions. A few paragraphs back, for instance, 
we quote the Commission as saying that “it is possible that there will be 
sufficient demand in some local telephone markets to support the con-
struction of competing local exchange facilities,”54 and surely that sen-
tence recognizes that entrants can build their own networks. The Court 
was therefore wrong to say that the Commission did not account for 
these ideas in its analysis; the Court’s actual complaint is that the Com-
mission did not build these ideas into the rules that were ultimately 
promulgated. 
                                                                                                                     
that they were called upon to unbundle additional elements above and beyond those unbundled 
on the federal level by the Commission. We quote this rule because it makes clear how the 
Commission was interpreting the “necessary” and “impair” standard. The Iowa Utilities Court, 
by contrast, quotes similar but more ambiguous language drawn from the document wherein 
the Commission explains and justifies both Rule 317 and Rule 319. See 525 US at 389, quot-
ing First Report & Order at ¶ 283 (cited in note 10). Note that, while the Supreme Court 
ultimately vacated only Rule 319 and left Rule 317 intact, the Eighth Circuit on remand rec-
ognized the link between these two rules, going so far as to vacate Rule 317 on grounds that, if 
Rule 319 was invalid, Rule 317 also could not stand. See Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 219 F3d 
744, 757 (8th Cir 2000). 
53 First Report & Order at ¶ 285 (emphasis added) (cited in note 10). Cf. 47 CFR 
§ 51.317(b)(2) (1997) (similar language used in Rule 317). 
54 See note 46. 
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If that is right, however, then it must be pointed out that the 
Commission was under no legal or logical obligation to build these ideas 
into its final rules. Suppose, for instance, that the Commission’s honest 
evaluation of unbundling was that, in most instances, elements should 
be unbundled even if they are also available through voluntary transac-
tions. Suppose, further, that the Commission believed that the added 
costs of distinguishing situations where that assumption works from 
situations where it does not are high—both administratively and with 
respect to the additional legal uncertainty imposed by a contingent 
rule—and thus that the public interest was better served by a rule that 
ignores the possibility of voluntary transactions. In such a case, the 
Commission would have written rules exactly like those criticized in 
Iowa Utilities, and yet the Commission would have indeed considered 
voluntary market transactions in formulating its rules. 
Turn attention for a moment to the Court’s second concern, namely 
that neither of the Commission’s interpretations included an explicit 
requirement that harms and differences be substantial. In the above-
quoted language about impairment, for instance, the Commission con-
cluded that a carrier is impaired in its ability to provide a given service if 
“the failure of an incumbent to provide access to a network element 
would decrease the quality, or increase the financial or administrative 
cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer.” That language 
seems to imply that—no matter how small—any increase in cost or de-
crease in quality would be sufficient to justify unbundling. And that, the 
Court objected, is an interpretation not sufficiently “in accord with the 
ordinary and fair meaning” of the terms “necessary” and “impair.”55 
Again, there is room to defend the Commission. A materiality re-
quirement was surely implicit in the Commission’s analysis; after all, if 
the Commission really believed that even trivial harms were sufficient to 
justify an unbundling obligation, the Commission would have required 
the unbundling of a large number of elements. In fact, the Commis-
sion’s rule had required that only seven elements be unbundled.56 Those 
elements obviously satisfy the barely-there impairment standard that the 
Court ascribes to the Commission, but almost certainly they also satisfy 
                                                       
55 525 US at 390. 
56 See 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997). 
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a much higher threshold—as the Commission itself concluded when it 
revisited these issues on remand.57 Moreover, the Commission’s list 
matches up quite well with the list Congress built into section 271, a 
provision that more fully specifies the unbundling requirement as it ap-
plies to former Bell Operating Companies interested in offering in-
region long distance service.58 That further suggests that the Commis-
sion in fact did apply some sort of materiality standard in its analysis, 
even if that standard was not explicitly written out. 
All that said, however, the Court’s real objection with respect to 
both market availability and materiality is that the Commission had not 
made sufficiently clear its assumptions, reservations, and interpretations. 
The document in which the Commission had explained its rules was 
muddled and at times seemingly inconsistent. That is understandable 
given that Congress had ordered the Commission to prepare the docu-
ment and issue the accompanying rules no later than six months after 
the enactment of the 1996 Act.59 But the Court nevertheless thought 
that the problems were serious enough so as to require that the Com-
mission attempt once more to clarify and explain the scope of the un-
bundling requirement. Hence the Court vacated the rule in which the 
Commission named the specific elements that were to be unbundled 
and then remanded for further proceedings both in the Commission and 
in the Eighth Circuit. 
Iowa Utilities does approve some other, less sweeping regulations 
that the Commission had put forward with regard to mandatory shar-
ing. For instance, the Commission had announced in the so-called “all 
elements” rule that an entrant can purchase access to unbundled net-
work elements even if that entrant does not itself own any telecommuni-
cations facilities.60 Incumbents had argued for the opposite rule, namely 
that entrants should have to bring at least some equipment to market in 
order to qualify for mandatory sharing. That, of course, would have de-
layed entry—presumably exactly what the incumbents were seeking—
                                                       
57 See 47 CFR § 51.319 (2002). 
58 See 47 USC § 271(c)(2)(B) (2002). For discussion, see Telecommunications Law & Policy 
at 755-67 (cited in note 6). 
59 47 USC § 251(d)(1). 
60 See First Report and Order at ¶¶ 328-40 (cited in note 10). 
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but it would have had the possibly offsetting benefit of encouraging en-
trants to invest in their own facilities, what is called in the industry “fa-
cilities-based” competition. The Court upheld the Commission mainly 
on grounds that the statute said nothing explicit on the subject.61 
Similarly, the Court sided with the Commission in its determina-
tion that incumbents should not be allowed to separate previously joined 
network elements before granting access to entrants.62 The idea, in the 
Commission’s words, was to stop incumbents from “disconnecting pre-
viously connected elements, over the objection of the requesting carrier, 
not for any productive reason, but just to impose wasteful reconnection 
costs on new entrants.”63 Incumbents had plausibly objected to this rule 
on grounds that it, especially when combined with the “all elements” 
rule, made it too easy for entrants to use the unbundling provisions to 
purchase complete telecommunications services. An entrant who wanted 
to purchase a complete service could do so under other provisions of the 
1996 Act, but at wholesale prices, not cost.64 The incumbents’ point was 
that the unbundling provisions should be kept meaningfully distinct 
from these resale provisions, in that way ensuring that each entry 
mechanism offers a unique mix of price, risk, and obligation.65 
Lastly, the Court also approved the Commission’s “pick-and-
choose” rule, an interpretation of section 252(i) of the Act. Section 
252(i) somewhat cryptically states that an incumbent must make any 
network element that it provides to one party “available to any other 
requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and condi-
tions as those provided in the agreement.”66 The Commission took this 
to mean that entrants can scour agreements previously reached between 
                                                       
61 525 US at 392-93. 
62 For the Commission’s rule, see 47 CFR § 51.315(b) (1997). For the Court’s discussion, see 
525 US at 395-396. 
63 525 US at 395, quoting Reply Brief (cited in note 51). 
64 Section 251(c)(4) states that an incumbent must sell to rivals, at wholesale rates, any tele-
communications service it provides at retail to subscribers. Section 251(b)(1) requires non-
incumbents to also offer these services for resale, but that provision says nothing about the 
relevant price. 47 USC §§ 251(c)(4), 251(b)(1). 
65 In essence, the incumbents were trying to stop a form of regulatory arbitrage. 
66 47 USC § 252(i). 
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incumbents and other entrants, pull out a provision from a deal over 
here and another over there—hence the pick-and-choose denomina-
tion—and cobble them together into a single agreement.67 But that in-
terpretation, incumbents pointed out, undermines the “give-and-take of 
negotiation,” since every concession made in one setting automatically 
becomes available in all future settings.68 Incumbents therefore favored 
an interpretation where an entrant would be allowed to use an existing 
agreement but only if taken as a whole. As we said, the Court in the end 
sided with the Commission, reasoning that the Commission’s approach, 
while unusual, tracked the actual language of the statute.69 
Let us pause a moment here and insure that we have not lost the 
forest for the trees. In addition to some jurisdictional issues,70 Iowa 
Utilities addressed a number of important questions about how manda-
tory sharing would work. The Court addressed these issues narrowly, 
focusing as it must on its job of statutory construction. But it ultimately 
approved and rejected an array of regulations that have significant impli-
cations for how sharing will work in the telecommunications market. 
Think, for instance, about pick-and-choose. An incumbent’s natural 
response to the Commission’s interpretation will be to push towards 
uniformity in its agreements, thereby minimizing the opportunities for 
cherry-picking across agreements. That does, to some extent, strait-
jacket the incumbents, and we should be concerned about that, but a 
countervailing benefit is that it pushes the incumbents toward non-
discrimination in their dealings with entrants. Non-discrimination du-
ties are frequently imposed on regulated firms as part of sharing re-
gimes71 and they are normally quite difficult to enforce. The pick-and-
choose rule goes at this from another angle, adopting something of a 
self-enforcing, de-centralized approach to nondiscrimination. Give 
some entrant a good deal on something and later entrants will grab it as 
                                                       
67 47 CFR § 51.809 (2002) (Commission regulation implementing the provision). 
68 525 US at 395. 
69 Id at 396. 
70 See note 6. 
71 See, for example, 16 USC § 824k(a) (2002) (nondiscrimination in wheeling electricity); 47 
USC § 251(b) (nondiscrimination duties of local exchange carriers); 47 USC § 251(c) (addi-
tional duties for ILECs). 
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well, almost like a statutory most-favored-nation clause. This decentral-
ized approach might very well be a superior alternative to centralized 
enforcement of non-discrimination obligations and ultimately an impor-
tant factor in how the 1996 Act’s overall sharing regime will work in 
practice. 
B. Verizon 
That takes us to this past Term and Verizon. At issue in Verizon was the 
Commission’s approach to pricing shared access. Incumbent local ex-
change carriers challenged the Commission’s rules on two grounds: first, 
that they were not a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Act; and, second, that under the rule of constitutional avoidance 
the Court should interpret the 1996 Act to preclude the Commission’s 
pricing methodology and in that way avoid the possible constitutional 
question of whether the statute as implemented by the Commission re-
sults in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. We will return to both of these arguments immediately 
below; but to understand them, it is helpful to begin by getting a sense 
of the issues at stake when it comes to setting the price for an unbundled 
network element. 
The first issue is whether access prices should be set at the level of 
marginal cost. Basic economics teaches that marginal cost pricing leads 
to efficient use. But marginal cost pricing does not compensate firms for 
their non-marginal investments—in this case, investments in copper 
wires, computerized telephone switches, and other parts of the local 
telecommunications network. Denying incumbents any return on these 
investments seems unfair, and it also would distinguish this market from 
a well-functioning conventional market, since even conventional mar-
kets allow competing firms to earn returns on their non-marginal in-
vestments. Worse, there is a dynamic wrinkle, namely that if incum-
bents are treated unfairly in this instance, new entrants might be reluc-
tant to enter the market for fear that future regulations will burn them, 
too.72 
                                                       
72 Of course, there are ways to compensate incumbents for their non-marginal investments 
while still setting access prices at the level of marginal cost. For example, the government could 
set prices at marginal cost—thereby maximizing efficiency—but then pay incumbents a one-
time cash transfer funded by general tax revenues. If that seems too vulnerable to government 
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All this might in the end mean that the right approach is to sacrifice 
efficiency and build non-marginal costs into access prices. But which 
costs? For example, should incumbents be allowed to recover the costs of 
an expensive computer system that was purchased even though a less 
expensive alternative would have sufficed? How might such a purchase 
be distinguished from a computer system that was wisely purchased, or a 
computer system that was prudent when purchased but turned out to be 
useless or excessive?73 Should we think differently about that question if 
it turns out that regulators encouraged incumbents to choose one com-
puter system over the other? What if regulators were more passively in-
volved, for example not explicitly weighing in on the decision but ap-
proving it after it was already made by the incumbent? Does that bind 
the government to later build the relevant expense into access prices on 
some form of implicit contract theory?74 
These concerns represent just the tip of the iceberg. How should we 
account for the monies that incumbents have already earned on their 
infrastructure investments, ensuring that regulation does not allow the 
incumbents to recoup their expenses twice? How should non-marginal 
                                                                                                                     
error or abuse, an alternative approach would have the government set prices at marginal cost 
and then encourage incumbents to sue for fair compensation under the Takings Clause. This 
would introduce the courts as a check on the level of the transfer payment, and this is in fact 
one way to understand the Verizon litigation. For discussion of these ideas in the context of the 
patent system, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, Vanderbilt L Rev (forthcom-
ing 2003); Douglas Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase 
of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 Harv J L & Tech 123 (1997). Note that using the Takings 
Clause in this manner might be particularly attractive if our main worry here is that, in the heat 
of the moment, regulated parties will be mistreated. The reason is that the takings approach 
separates in time the decision to regulate from the decision over fair compensation. 
73 This is not just a hypothetical difficulty. For example, telecommunications firms have spent 
billions of dollars in recent years laying over 100 million miles of high-capacity optical fiber, yet 
it is estimated that only 2.7% of that installed fiber is currently being used. See Yochi J. 
Dreazen, Wildly Optimistic Data Drove Telecoms to Build Fiber Glut, Wall Street Journal (Sep-
tember 26, 2002). Was this a case of imprudent investment run amok, or did these investments 
make sense at the time but prove unwise in hindsight? For discussion of a similar problem in 
the electric industry—namely storage facilities built to accompany planned nuclear power 
plants where the relevant power plants were then never built—see State of North Carolina Utili-
ties Commission v Thornburg, 325 NC 484 (1989) and State of North Carolina Utilities Commis-
sion v Thornburg, 325 NC 463 (1989). 
74 For more detailed discussion of the so-called regulatory contract, see Gregory Sidak  and 
Daniel Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge, 1997). 
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costs be adjusted in light of various tax and accounting issues; for in-
stance, if an incumbent has depreciated the value of a given infrastruc-
ture investment in a particular way in order to achieve some tax advan-
tage, should that depreciation path be binding in this setting as well? 
And, realistically, how well can we expect the government to estimate 
any of these many figures, given that the best source for all this informa-
tion is the regulated incumbent itself, but the regulated incumbent has 
strong incentives to distort this information in ways that increase access 
prices? 
A second set of issues here involves the relationship between access 
prices and the incentives firms face to either improve the existing net-
work or build new infrastructure. Consider the incentives facing new 
entrants first. If access prices are sufficiently low, entrants have little 
reason to venture into the business of actually developing their own fa-
cilities. Why take on the risk of building it yourself when the existing 
infrastructure is available at a bargain price? That is not so troubling if 
we think that incumbents are better suited to build and innovate any-
way—say, because they have more experience in the industry, or more 
financial wherewithal—but it is more likely that, when we say we want 
competition in the local loop, we mean that we want several firms work-
ing on new ideas about marketing, pricing, and, yes, the design of the 
network itself. If that is true, low prices can undermine a key objective 
of the Act.75  
Of course, high prices can be just as bad. A sufficiently high price 
might lead entrants to build their own infrastructure even in instances 
where society would be better off had the entrants just shared existing 
equipment. Entrants would be building in this instance not because the 
                                                       
75 Even if prices are low, entrants do still have some incentive to innovate. For instance, en-
trants have an incentive to innovate with respect to whatever infrastructure and services they 
combine with the incumbent’s unbundled network elements; so, to be simple, if an entrant 
leases copper lines from the incumbent but is using its own computer system to provide inter-
net access over those lines, obviously the entrant has incentive to upgrade and improve its own 
computer system. Similarly, entrants have some incentive to innovate with respect to leased 
elements, too. Staying with our simple example, if our hypothetical entrant sees a way to im-
prove the copper lines, he might contact the relevant incumbent and offer to cut a deal, sug-
gesting the improvement to the incumbent and in exchange demanding some sort of financial 
reward. Our point in the text is only that a significant incentive disappears if the regulated price 
of leased access is too low.  
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new infrastructure was cost-justified, but instead because the regulated 
price was artificially high. In some of these instances, the incumbent 
might voluntarily offer the entrant a lower price, thereby avoiding ineffi-
cient build-around. But that seems unlikely, at least if the incumbent’s 
main goal is to keep the costs of entry high and thereby protect its mar-
ket dominance. Moreover, even if the incumbent does offer a lower 
price, the Act will have played no role in that outcome; a world with a 
mandatory sharing regime and a sufficiently high access price is roughly 
equivalent to a world with no mandatory sharing regime at all. 
Now consider the incentives facing incumbents. If our goal is to 
maximize incumbents’ investment incentives, it is not at all clear how 
best to set the access price. On the one hand, if incumbents know that 
their facilities will be available to rivals at low rates, they might be reluc-
tant to invest in new infrastructure. What would be the point, since any 
advantage would immediately be made available to rivals anyway? 
Worse, the costs of any errors would be borne entirely by the incum-
bent, since a dud technology would not attract any buyers. On this story, 
low access prices seem likely to discourage investment in unbundled net-
work elements, driving incumbents to invest instead in their brand 
names and other resources not subject to mandatory sharing.  
On the other hand, low access prices can stimulate investment. 
Consider, for example, an investment that would slightly decrease the 
marginal costs of providing some network element. If access prices are 
high, demand is likely low, and the allure of investing in this new tech-
nology is thus also relatively low. Saving a few pennies on each of a few 
sales simply does not warrant a significant infrastructure expense. If ac-
cess prices are low, however, demand for the network element will sky-
rocket, and now the analysis might shift, since saving a few pennies on 
each of a large number of sales might very well justify a significant infra-
structure investment.76 Thus we can say nothing definitive about the 
access price that maximizes an incumbent’s incentive to innovate. 
                                                       
76 This is a consistent with the literature that questions whether monopolists or competitors 
have a greater incentive to engage in innovation. The point there, and here, is that one impor-
tant factor is the researching firm’s expectations as to the number of units it will ultimately sell. 
For links into that literature, see Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 390-94 
(MIT, 1988). 
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The Commission could not escape so easily; it had to promulgate 
some rule, and whatever rule it chose was going to have implications for 
all of the various incentives and debates outlined above. Congress had 
given the Commission little help in this effort. Remember, the relevant 
provision of the 1996 Act states only that firms should be allowed to 
purchase access to unbundled network elements at “just and reasonable 
rates” that are “non-discriminatory” and “may include a reasonable 
profit.”77 Good luck mapping those vague constraints to the practical 
issues at stake in the decision. Congress had offered one further bit of 
guidance, however, namely a clause in section 252 that states that rates 
should be “based on . . . cost” but “determined without reference to a 
rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding.”78 That is a lot of lingo, 
but the clause seems to refer to and reject the conventional mechanisms 
that had previously been used to set prices in telecommunications and 
other regulated industries. Congress did not tell the Commission what 
alternative to adopt; but Congress seems to be saying that the old ap-
proaches—each fraught with difficulties well known in the network in-
dustries literature79—were not to be applied. 
Writing on this virtually blank slate, the Commission adopted the 
following approach. First, the Commission chose to interpret “cost” to 
mean “forward-looking economic cost” instead of cost defined by the 
actual historic investments made in the particular element at issue.80 
The FCC defined the forward-looking cost of a network element to be 
the sum of “the total element long-run incremental cost of the element” 
(TELRIC) plus “a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common 
costs” where common costs are “costs incurred in providing a group of 
elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements.”81 
Most controversially, the Commission announced that TELRIC would 
“be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications 
                                                       
77 47 USC § 252(d). 
78 Id.  
79 For an introduction to the standard approaches and their pitfalls, see Telecommunications 
Law and Policy at 425-29 (cited in note 6). 
80 See 47 CFR § 51.505 (2002). 
81 47 CFR § 51.505(a) (2002). 
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technology currently available and the lowest cost network configura-
tion, given the existing location” of the incumbent’s wire centers.82 
Again, a great deal of lingo; but the key insights here are two. First, 
when fully unpacked, the Commission’s rule adopts a middling position 
with respect to most of the competing factors discussed above. Forward-
looking cost as defined by the Commission focuses on marginal cost but 
also accounts for some fixed costs, some degree of profit, some degree of 
depreciation over time, and so on. It is in truth a complicated balance that, 
for better or worse, can be applied flexibly to various specific network ele-
ments. Second, and a bit more extreme, the Commission’s approach does 
take a firm stance on the issue of incumbent-specific costs: while access 
prices will account for a variety of factors, those factors will largely be cal-
culated in the abstract instead of being specifically mapped to the actual 
history of the network element at issue. This avoids the problem of relying 
too heavily on numbers that only the incumbent knows; and it also 
matches up with how value is calculated in competitive markets, since the 
value of any good is determined by its benefits and costs as compared to 
current alternatives, not the history of how much its seller spent in creat-
ing it. The downsides to this approach from the incumbents’ perspective 
are that it might mean that some investments will never be fully recouped, 
and it almost surely means that access prices will steadily drop over time as 
new alternatives erode the value of existing infrastructure. 
The legal analysis in Verizon did not end up delving significantly into 
any of the above details. The Court surveyed these issues, but on the ques-
tion of whether the Commission’s interpretation was reasonable, the 
Court quickly recognized that there was considerable discretion built into 
the statute. For instance, the incumbents had argued that the Commis-
sion’s pricing methodology was not “based on . . . cost” because, among 
other things, the Commission had defined cost to mean the expense 
that would be incurred were an equivalent network built today instead of 
adopting the arguably more conventional definition that cost means ac-
tual monies spent. The Court responded that the word cost “is a virtu-
ally meaningless term” that gives “rate setting commissions broad meth-
odological leeway” and says “little about the method employed to deter-
                                                       
82 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1) (2002). 
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mine a particular rate.”83 In short, given the vague language used in the 
Act, virtually anything the Commission had put forward in terms of its 
pricing methodology would have fallen within the scope of Chevron defer-
ence. When it came to access pricing, Congress seems to have had only 
one specific detail in mind—a distrust of the traditional approaches—and, 
whatever one wants to say about the Commission’s rule, it certainly is not 
a traditional approach. 
The possible issue with respect to the Takings Clause was also eas-
ily—albeit somewhat unsatisfactorily—resolved. Again, the incumbents 
had argued that the Court should interpret the 1996 Act to preclude the 
Commission’s pricing methodology in order to avoid the possible consti-
tutional question of whether the statute as implemented by the Commis-
sion results in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Court refused to do so on grounds that the takings 
claim as alleged by the incumbents did not itself raise a “serious question,” 
or at least that it did not raise a sufficiently serious question to warrant 
application of the rule of constitutional avoidance. The primary reason was 
that the incumbents were endeavoring to challenge a pricing methodology 
as opposed to specific rates. This ran against the Court’s “general rule” that 
it does not consider “a taking challenge on ratesetting methodology with-
out being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory.”84 
The logic is that it is difficult to anticipate how a methodology will trans-
late into numbers. The pricing methodology at issue in Verizon, for in-
stance, was so flexible that it was still almost impossible for the Court to 
guess whether the resulting prices would be high or low, let alone uncon-
stitutionally low in violation of the Takings Clause. The Court was thus 
reluctant to deem the constitutional issue sufficiently serious.85 
All that strikes us as somewhat reasonable and we do not want to be 
unfairly critical; however, this decision to in effect defer the incumbents’ 
possible takings claim had significant implications, and we are not con-
                                                       
83 122 S Ct at 1667 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
84 Id at 1679. 
85 The Court did indicate that it might have been willing to further consider the takings claim 
if there were evidence that the regulatory change had been “arbitrary, opportunistic, or under-
taken with a confiscatory purpose.” Id at 1681. There was no such evidence presented, how-
ever. 
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vinced that the Court weighed them with care. First, by punting on the 
takings claim, the Court in essence set in motion fifty new lawsuits that 
will soon be filed in the federal courts, each alleging that the pricing pro-
visions as tailored and implemented in a specific state violate the Tak-
ings Clause given the regulatory history of that state’s incumbents. 
Maybe that flood of litigation was unavoidable, but one wonders never-
theless whether the Court could have said something more to help shape 
expectations and thus minimize the disruption those cases will ulti-
mately cause. 
Second and more broadly, while it might sound prudent to delay 
any serious takings analysis until actual numbers are in hand, the fact is 
that the benefits of delay are small and the costs are substantial. Focus 
on the benefits first. Delay does indeed mean that, when the claim is 
litigated in the future, there will be real numbers to work with instead of 
just a verbal description of the Commission’s pricing methodology. But 
numbers really do not matter much when it comes to answering the ba-
sic questions about whether there can be a taking in a situation like this 
and, more specifically, how courts will ultimately calculate the extent of 
any such taking. These are difficult questions to be sure, but the answers 
are not at all tied to specific numbers. The Court was therefore in as 
good a position to answer them in Verizon as it will be in some hypo-
thetical case down the road. 
The benefits of waiting, then, seem small; but consider the costs. 
The Takings Clause is primed to play a central and beneficial role in the 
implementation of the unbundled network elements regime. For it to do 
so, however, both the Commission and the incumbents need to have 
confidence that ultimately a takings remedy will be available. Think of it 
this way: if the takings claim looks implausible, the Commission has to 
set prices with an eye toward balancing several competing factors. Spe-
cifically, the price has to promote efficient use of network elements in 
the short run; promote efficient investment in research and development 
by the incumbents in the long-run; similarly promote efficient invest-
ment in research and development by new entrants in the long-run; and 
on top of that address the distributional implications that are the core of 
the takings claim. This is hard to accomplish, both because the analysis 
becomes complicated with all these factors in play and because these 
factors often push in opposite directions. For instance, to maximize 
short-run efficiency, the Commission should set prices at the level of 
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marginal cost, but to address the distributional issue prices will certainly 
have to be far above marginal cost.  
If the Commission and the incumbents have confidence that a tak-
ings claim will ultimately be successful, by contrast, the Commission can 
ignore the distributional issue when setting access prices and focus ex-
clusively on the various incentive effects. It can do this knowing all the 
while that any distributional issue will be fairly addressed separately. 
This is important because it eliminates the tension identified above. If 
the distributional and efficiency issues can be handled separately, then 
when the Commission sets its prices it does not have to compromise on 
efficiency in order to account for distributional concerns. Instead, it can 
set prices that sensibly balance all the various incentives and then, 
through takings litigation, help to ensure that incumbents are fairly 
compensated for their losses. Incumbents, meanwhile, would in these 
circumstances be precluded from arguing against the Commission’s 
prices on purely distributional grounds. That would not only narrow the 
grounds for disagreement but perhaps also dampen incumbents’ incen-
tives to delay implementation of the Act. 
Again, all this is possible only if the Commission and the incum-
bents can have confidence that the distributional issue will ultimately be 
addressed. The Verizon Court did nothing in support of that aim. This 
is not suprising given existing Takings Clause jurisprudence. The lead-
ing cases do express a general reluctance to litigate takings claims in the 
abstract, and the Court certainly was understandably reluctant to rewrite 
takings law as part of the Verizon litigation. That said, however, the net 
result here is that the Court will have slightly better information to work 
with if and when it finally does evaluate the takings claim, but the bulk 
of the value in allowing that claim will have already been sacrificed.  
II. Natural Monopoly and Entry 
From its infancy, federal telecommunications law has proceeded on the 
assumption that local telephone service is a natural monopoly. That is, it 
has been assumed that costs in this market are such that it is less expen-
sive for demand to be met by one firm than it is for demand to be met 
by any number of competing firms. In this section, we want to explore 
in some detail what it means to say that something is a natural monop-
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oly and, further, what insight that might offer in terms of understanding 
the issues at stake in Iowa Utilities and Verizon and, more broadly, the 
local competition provisions of the 1996 Act itself. 
A. Natural Monopoly in the Local Telephone Market 
Let us start by making the case that local telephone service is indeed 
best understood as a natural monopoly. Again, the generic definition is 
that natural monopoly occurs where it is less expensive for demand to be 
met by one firm than it would be for that same demand to be met by 
some number of competing firms. One reason that this might be true in 
local telephony is that there are significant fixed costs associated with 
telephone service. For example, to provide service, a firm must lay wires 
throughout the relevant area and install appropriate computer equip-
ment to route telephone signals along the network. It would greatly in-
crease the total cost of telephone service to have two firms incur those 
same expenses in the same geographic area, and any such added costs are 
pure waste if a single network could have satisfied demand. Thus, on 
this argument, telephone service looks like a natural monopoly. 
There are other reasons as well to think that local telephone service 
exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly.86 For instance, an indi-
vidual’s demand for telephone service varies significantly from moment 
to moment and day to day; yet, in order to provide adequate service, the 
telephone company has to be ready to serve a given user whenever that 
user happens to pick up the telephone. If a different firm were to serve 
each user, there would be significant waste since almost all of each 
phone system’s capacity would sit idle for most of the day. By having a 
single firm serve a large number of users, by contrast, the costs of pro-
viding phone service can be lowered dramatically. Several users can share 
a given amount of capacity, putting the equipment to better use since 
the variance in each consumer’s demand would to some degree cancel 
out, leaving less of the phone system’s capacity to sit idle at a given time. 
Sometimes—say, Mother’s Day—everyone will want to use the phone at 
the same moment, and, at that time, some customers will be denied ser-
vice; but, for most of the year, users can share capacity without any deg-
radation in service, and thus it is cheaper to have a single firm serve 
                                                       
86 Parts of this discussion are adopted, with permission, from Telecommunications Law and 
Policy at 614-18 (cited in note 6). 
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many customers than it is to have multiple firms serve that same number 
of customers. 
Similarly, telephone systems are said to exhibit “network effects,” 
which for our purposes means that the benefits of telephone ownership 
increase as the number of subscribers increases. A single telephone in 
isolation is of little value to its owner since there is no one to call. But 
the usefulness of that telephone grows exponentially as more and more 
people join the same telephone network. If there were competing tele-
phone networks, to achieve this same level of value society would have 
to spend considerably greater resources. Perhaps consumers would have 
to purchase and maintain multiple telephones, using their WorldCom 
telephone to talk to their friends on the WorldCom network and their 
AT&T telephone to talk to their friends on the AT&T network.87 Or 
perhaps the government would have to force the networks to intercon-
nect—an expensive proposition given that it would likely require that 
the government monitor compliance, oversee negotiations, and other-
wise help to ensure that the various reluctant allies work together. In 
short, network effects increase the value of having just a single telephone 
network, which is the same thing as saying that having multiple tele-
phone networks increases the costs of achieving a given quality of ser-
vice. That, like the two preceding arguments, makes it likely that local 
telephone service is a natural monopoly. 
So what? As we will explain below, characterizing local telephone 
service as a natural monopoly tells us very little. It does not tell us 
whether we should expect to see competition. It does not tell us 
whether, if we see competition, we should be pleased or discouraged. It 
does not tell us that there should be regulation, nor does it tell us that 
regulation is unnecessary. Instead, characterizing local telephone service 
as a natural monopoly tells us only that there is an important conversa-
tion to be had—a conversation about the possibility of competition in 
                                                       
87 A similar set of issues is currently playing out with respect to instant messaging (IM). 
America Online has had the leading IM service. Entrants, including Yahoo and Microsoft, 
have sought to interconnect their IM programs with AOL’s, in that way gaining quick access 
to a large pool of IM users. AOL has responded with technology walls that make it more diffi-
cult for new entrants to interconnect with the AOL IM network. Users, in turn, have re-
sponded by downloading multiple IM programs. See Jim Hu and Sandeep Junnarkar, AOL 
Blocks Microsoft Net Messaging, CNET News.com (July 23, 1999). 
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the first place, and the costs and benefits of competition should we be-
lieve it possible. It is to that conversation that we now turn.  
B. Implications of Natural Monopoly 
Natural monopoly suggests a contrast to unnatural monopoly or artificial 
monopoly. This is in fact how Judge Learned Hand saw the issue in 
1945 when—because the Supreme Court could not muster a quo-
rum88—the Second Circuit was called upon to offer the final word as to 
whether Alcoa had monopolized the aluminum market in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: 
It does not follow because Alcoa had . . . a monopoly, that 
it “monopolized” the ingot market: it may not have 
achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon 
it. If it had been a combination of existing smelters which 
united the whole industry and controlled the production of 
all aluminum ingot, it would certainly have “monopolized” 
the market. In several decisions the Supreme Court has de-
creed the dissolution of such combinations, although they 
had engaged in no unlawful trade practices. . . . [P]ersons 
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monop-
oly, automatically so to say: that is, without having in-
tended either to put an end to existing competition, or to 
prevent competition from arising when none had existed; 
they may become monopolists by force of accident. . . . A 
market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible 
to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by 
a plant large enough to supply the whole demand. Or there 
may be changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but 
one purveyor. A single producer may be the survivor out of 
a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his supe-
rior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong ar-
gument can be made that, although the result may expose 
the public to the evils of monopoly, the [Sherman] Act 
                                                       
88 See Allen-Myland, Inc. v IBM, 33 F3d 194, 203 n10 (3d Cir 1996) (“In Alcoa, however, a 
sufficient number of justices were recused that a quorum could not be obtained; accordingly, 
the Supreme Court . . . remanded the case to the three most senior judges of the Second Cir-
cuit”). 
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does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very 
forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coro-
nat. The successful competitor, having been urged to com-
pete, must not be turned upon when he wins.89 
Hand’s point is that artificial monopoly and natural monopoly re-
quire different sorts of legal responses. Mergers between rivals and col-
lusion among competitors both create artificial forms of monopoly and, 
in Hand’s view, both are rightly regulated under federal antitrust law. 
But “natural” monopoly—what Hand saw as monopoly thrust upon a 
firm either as the inevitable result of vigorous competition or because of 
the cost structure of the relevant market—is different. It might lead to 
the same evils in terms of high prices and restricted quantities, but it 
should be regulated, if at all, through special legislation targeted at the 
particular industry, not through the generic provisions of antitrust. 
So far so good, but matters become significantly less clear when the 
question turns to what exactly that special legislation should say. Con-
sider a core case of natural monopoly, for example a situation where a 
firm has to first undertake a substantial fixed cost before any units of the 
relevant product can be produced, but the firm can then produce as 
many units as it wants at a stable per-unit cost. Computer software, for 
example, matches this pattern. A company spends a substantial amount 
of money to write, test and debug its software, but once the product is in 
hand, it can produce as many CDs as it wants at a set per-unit cost. 
Note why this cost structure can be thought of as a natural monop-
oly cost structure. The least expensive way to produce any amount of the 
good in question is to have one firm supply all comers. This is the con-
                                                       
89 United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 430 (1945). Hand wrote this against 
an almost non-existent Supreme Court backdrop. The Court had used the phrase “natural 
monopoly” only twice, first in 1910 in a dispute over a waterworks plant, City of Omaha v 
Omaha Water Co, 218 US 180 (1910), and then again in 1932 in a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge to an Oklahoma statute restricting entry into the ice business, New State Ice Co v 
Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932). Neither case had offered any real sense of how to think about 
natural monopoly or its implications. Perhaps even more interesting, the Court had not used 
the phrase in any of its three key pre-Alcoa decisions on the constitutional limits on public 
utility rate regulation—Smyth, Southwestern Bell and Hope Natural Gas—three cases that would 
today almost surely be analyzed as cases primarily about natural monopoly. See Federal Power 
Commission v Hope Natural Gas Co, 320 US 591 (1944); Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co v Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 US 276 (1923); Smyth v Ames, 169 US 
466 (1898). 
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ventional—perhaps even natural!—definition of natural monopoly.90 If 
two firms were to produce, the fixed costs would be incurred twice; and 
yet there would be no benefit, since per-unit cost is the same regardless 
of how production is split between the two firms. That is, if the industry 
produces ten units, the marginal cost of producing each unit will be the 
same regardless of whether all ten are produced by one firm, five are 
produced by one firm and five by the other, or any other pattern. The 
only cost that changes is the amount of money invested up front. Those 
fixed costs rise directly with the number of firms in the industry—two 
times the fixed costs with two firms, fifty times with fifty firms—and, 
focusing just on the costs of production, we are therefore better off hav-
ing only one firm produce.91 
But does this cost structure mean that we will see only one firm in 
the market? In short, does a natural monopoly naturally lead to monop-
oly? And, if so, what implications flow from that conclusion? Start with 
the second question first. If we would naturally see only one firm pro-
ducing in a natural monopoly market, we would then need to be con-
cerned about whether that firm can exercise monopoly power. The so-
cial harm of monopoly is well-known: monopolists tend to raise prices 
and restrict output, the net effect being both a transfer of wealth from 
consumers to the monopolist and pure deadweight loss in the form of 
efficient transactions that never take place due to the monopolist’s su-
pra-competitive price. This is an argument for regulating the monopo-
list’s price and, if the monopolist can respond to price regulation by 
skimping on quality, then regulating his quality, too. 
We should be careful though. Even if natural monopoly means that 
there will be only one firm producing, that does not at all imply that the 
firm will be capable of exercising market power. This is part of what had 
worried Hand in Alcoa and the same question has been an issue in the 
Microsoft antitrust litigation.92 But the theory is clear: the threat of po-
                                                       
90 See, for example, Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 101 
(Addison-Wesley, 3d ed 2000). 
91 Notice that this is an argument about the costs of production; it says nothing about the price 
that will ultimately prevail. For discussion of other cost structures that lead to natural monop-
oly, see Telecommunications Law and Policy at 374-80 (cited in note 6). 
92 See Robert E. Hall, Optimal Contracts to Defend Upstream Monopoly 23 (January 25, 2000) 
(working paper on file with authors). 
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tential entry can exert substantial pressure on prices, even in a market 
where everyone knows that at the end of the day only one firm will re-
main standing. The idea is that the producing firm will in certain in-
stances have to cabin its price in order to discourage would-be rivals 
from entering the market, undercutting the prevailing price, and ulti-
mately taking over as the new monopolist. The credibility of this threat 
depends on a host of issues; for instance, if the existing firm can change 
its price quickly, the threat of entry might not be substantial, since the 
moment a rival enters the existing firm will be able to match the rival’s 
price and in that way thwart the rival’s strategy. Conversely, if the exist-
ing firm cannot change its price quickly, or indeed if it can change price 
quickly but is slow at detecting entry by a rival, then the threat of future 
entry is significant and the existing firm will face strong pressure to keep 
prices low.93 
That answers the second of our questions, but what of the first? All 
of the analysis so far has assumed that, at equilibrium, natural monopoly 
means that there will be only one firm producing in the market. But that 
is not necessarily right, since even in the face of natural monopoly costs 
there is still often a real incentive for firms to enter the market. Be clear 
on what that means: even if we have a cost technology such that overall 
production costs could be minimized by having a single firm produce, 
we might see more than one firm producing. When might that be true? 
One key issue is what the potential entrant anticipates the incumbent 
producer will do in response to entry. For example, if the entrant be-
lieves that the incumbent will cut prices to marginal cost, the entrant 
would foresee little chance of recovering its fixed costs—hardly an at-
tractive business plan to the venture capitalists or bond-holders forking 
over the money to pay the fixed costs. In contrast, if the entrant believes 
that it and the incumbent will be able to come to terms, either through 
explicit collusion or implicit interactions in the marketplace, the entrant 
may anticipate sufficient profits so as to justify entry despite the natural 
monopoly cost structure. 
Economists, it turns out, have said a lot about all of this. If we ex-
pect the incumbent and the entrant to compete in prices—so-called 
                                                       
93 See William J. Baumol et al, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 2 (Har-
court, 1988). 
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Bertand competition94—then the resulting Nash equilibrium would 
result in marginal cost pricing and hence the entrant has no incentive to 
enter in the first place. In that case, natural monopoly does naturally 
lead to monopoly. If we expect the incumbent and entrant to compete in 
quantities, however—Cournot competition95—we may have entry by 
some number of firms and an equilibrium with some competition. Simi-
larly, if we expect the incumbent and the entrant to bifurcate the mar-
ket, with each firm specializing in some subset of customer needs or 
some specific geographic area, we might again see an equilibrium with 
multiple firms, this time with each firm acting as a monopolist to its 
own smaller sub-market. 
Where does all this leave us? If we have natural monopoly costs and 
just one firm producing but we do not have potential entrants exerting 
pressure on prices, natural monopoly means a market where prices are 
inefficiently high. That is a problem and should make clear why rate 
regulation has been the historical legislative response to natural monop-
oly situations. If, by contrast, we have natural monopoly costs, one firm 
producing, and a real threat of potential entry, then we likely will have 
quasi-competitive pricing and, interestingly, no need for regulation. 
Lastly, if we have natural monopoly costs but nevertheless the possibility 
of multiple firms in the market, we have a choice to make. We can re-
strict competition—that is, turn away would-be competitors—and in 
that way force the market to revert to one of the two situations just con-
sidered. That was the traditional approach to the local telephone market 
adopted by federal telecommunications law in its infancy and main-
tained up until the 1996 Act.96 Or we can embrace the possibility of 
competition but use regulation simultaneously to mitigate the economic 
waste it causes and to insure that prices stay well below the monopolistic 
level. This, as we will discuss further, is arguably the approach adopted 
under the 1996 Act. 
Obviously this choice has implications not only for social welfare 
but also for would-be market participants. For instance, the first firm to 
                                                       
94 Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization at 157-61 (cited in note 90). 
95 Id at 166-68. 
96 This parallels the long-standing approach of regulating entry by giving public utilities com-
missions the power to enforce certificate of convenience and necessity statutes. 
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enter a natural monopoly market might be reluctant to invest heavily 
without promises from the state that later competitors will be turned 
away. It is one thing to invest in a natural monopoly market where your 
firm will be the sole regulated entrant; quite another to invest in a natu-
ral monopoly market that might feature a revolving cast of would-be 
competitors. Local governments used to lure cable television providers 
by making just these sorts of promises.97 Applicants would compete ex 
ante to be the chosen firm, but once a winner was chosen, that winner 
would be awarded an exclusive franchise for the term of the deal. Local 
officials would regulate cable prices and thus ensure that the chosen firm 
was not behaving as a monopolist, but in exchange the government 
would protect that firm from competition. Federal law changed to pro-
hibit the practice in 1992, the fear being that the ability to grant exclu-
sive licenses invested too much power in local government.98 
C. Implications for the 1996 Act, Iowa Utilities and Verizon 
The preceding analysis tells us what to expect if local telephone service 
turns out to exhibit the properties of a natural monopoly. Let us now 
connect these issues first to the 1996 Act and then to both Iowa Utilities 
and Verizon. We said in the Introduction that the purpose of the Act’s 
unbundling provisions is to promote competition. But how does that 
claim link to the discussion here about natural monopolies? There are 
several possible answers. 
One possibility is that the Act rejects the longstanding view that the 
market for local telephone service exhibits the properties of a natural 
monopoly. On this interpretation, either regulators have been wrong all 
these years about how the economics of this industry play out, or they 
have been right but the dynamics of the market are different now thanks 
to new technologies like wireless telephony and the possibility of carry-
ing voice traffic over the cable television infrastructure. Note that the 
purpose of the 1996 Act on this story is to guide the transition from a 
                                                       
97 For discussion, see Telecommunications Law and Policy at 429-31 (cited in note 6). 
98 This change was made by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, 
which prohibited local government both from granting exclusive franchises and from unrea-
sonably refusing to award additional franchises. See Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-385, 106 Stat 1460 (1992) at § 7(a)(1), codified 
at 47 USC § 541 (2002). 
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regulated natural monopoly to an unregulated, competitive market. 
Sharing provisions encourage entry during this transition period and 
possibly also make up for any advantages enjoyed by the incumbents by 
virtue of their long involvement in the local market. But on this view the 
sharing provisions should ultimately sunset once the transition period is 
complete. 
A more likely interpretation of the 1996 Act is that it does not re-
ject the notion that local telephone service is a natural monopoly, but 
instead simply reflects a new consensus that the costs of competition are 
not so high as once feared and thus a mix of competition and regulation 
might in the end be more attractive than an approach that relies on 
regulation alone. Phrased another way, it might be the case that the ex-
perience of regulating monopolist telephone carriers over the years has 
convinced Congress that regulation in that form is too costly, insuffi-
ciently effective, or both, and thus the 1996 Act experiments with a 
more competitive approach. Such an approach might mean increased 
economic waste, but the upside is that competition can supplement 
regulation and perhaps create better incentives when it comes to innova-
tion, quality, and price. Note that, this time, there is no reason to believe 
that the 1996 Act will ever sunset; competition in this story is a supple-
ment to, but not a replacement for, government regulation. 
It is tempting to offer two other possible interpretations of the 1996 
Act, but neither is correct. The first would suggest that the Act’s real 
purpose is to help policymakers answer the question of whether and to 
what extent local telephone service is a natural monopoly. On this view, 
if entrants invoke the mandatory sharing provisions, then it can be as-
sumed that the market has natural monopoly properties, whereas if they 
build their own infrastructure, the opposite implication can be drawn. 
That would be great, but it turns out that neither of those inferences 
hold. Entrants will use the shared access provisions if the regulated price 
of access is lower than the price of self provision, a decision that has 
nothing to do with natural monopoly and everything to do with regula-
tion. Similarly, entrants will build their own facilities if the regulated 
price is higher than the price of self provision, again irrespective of any 
natural monopoly issues. This is one of the reasons why the pricing rules 
at issue in Verizon are so important; the government is regulating prices 
because of a natural monopoly problem, but it is those prices—not the 
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underlying economics of the market—that will determine both patterns 
of entry and the incentive to develop new infrastructure. 
The second tempting but incorrect interpretation casts the 1996 Act 
as an exercise in deregulation. As is surely clear by now, that is not at all 
right, since the Act introduces a great deal of new regulation, and much 
of it will powerfully influence behavior in the local telephone market. 
That said, the 1996 Act does promise to diminish the importance of 
regulation, since if competition takes hold, competitive forces will do 
some of the work formerly accomplished by government fiat. The 1996 
Act, then, is probably best understood as regulation designed to harness 
competition. Regulation will still in some instances be outcome-
determinative, but in most cases outcomes will be determined by some 
combination of regulation and competitive pressures. 
Turn now to Iowa Utilities. We pointed out above that there is no 
natural connection between a natural monopoly cost structure on the 
one hand and the possibility of competitive supply on the other. As ap-
plied to local telephone service, this means that network elements—even 
network elements that exhibit the properties of a natural monopoly—
can in certain cases be competitively supplied even in the absence of 
regulation. The upside is that competitive supply might yield good in-
centives for quality, pricing, and innovation; the downside is that com-
petitive supply in the face of natural monopoly risks wasteful duplication 
of resources. The 1996 Act does not specifically speak to this tradeoff, 
and thus it does not give the Commission direct guidance in how to 
react to this possibility of competition. Based solely on the provisions 
enacted, it is possible that Congress meant to unbundle only those ele-
ments where competition was unlikely. But it is also possible that Con-
gress meant to unbundle any element that exhibits natural monopoly 
properties. 
This was part of what the Commission had to struggle with when 
interpreting the necessary and impair standards of section 251(d)(2). 
And, while the Commission did not issue a clear final statement on this 
particular question, the regulations at issue in Iowa Utilities certainly 
were broad enough to include in the unbundling regime elements where 
competition is possible even without mandatory unbundling. The Court 
did not reject this conclusion per se; as we have pointed out, the Court 
merely pushed for further explanation as to how the Commission had 
come to this conclusion and, more specifically, how the possibility of 
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market provision affects the scope of the unbundling requirement in the 
Commission’s view. 
Verizon addressed issues a little further removed from our basic in-
tuitions about natural monopolies. The core issue there was the price at 
which the government would require incumbents to sell access to their 
unbundled network elements; and, while an understanding of natural 
monopoly helps us to think about whether sharing itself makes sense, 
that understanding tells us very little about the optimal price at which 
any sharing should take place. That said, our discussion of natural mo-
nopoly does elucidate one aspect of Verizon, namely the incumbents’ 
takings claim. As we explained above, while natural monopoly can lead 
to any number of regulatory responses, firms in a regulated market care 
a great deal about which regulatory response is chosen. Indeed, firms 
rely on and react to the government’s decision with respect to regulatory 
form, adjusting their pricing and investment patterns accordingly. This 
is the core insight behind the incumbents’ takings claim. Their objection 
is that the government changed the rules of the market midstream, leav-
ing incumbents holding the bag with respect to their long-term invest-
ments. The strength of that argument depends on a number of factors—
including whether the incumbents should have expected the possibility 
of regulatory reform, and whether the incumbents have already earned 
sufficient returns on their investments anyway—but the core insight is 
that firms working in regulated natural monopoly markets do make in-
vestment decisions that are in part contingent on which of the several 
plausible regulatory responses the incumbent expects. 
III. Shared Access Under the 1996 Act 
We are now ready to consider in more detail how regulation of the form 
established by the 1996 Act differs from regulation as it had previously 
existed in the local telephone market. We will focus on three principal 
changes. First, under the old approach, local telephone service was regu-
lated under the assumption that there should be only one monopolist 
seller serving each community. The 1996 Act, by contrast, allows for 
multiple competing sellers. Second, under the old approach, the entire 
local loop was lumped together and regulated as an undifferentiated 
whole. The new approach attempts to quarantine the effects of regula-
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tion by focusing more narrowly on particular network elements. Third 
and finally, the old approach relied heavily on government regulation of 
output prices, by which we mean regulation of the prices for goods and 
services sold directly to consumers. The new approach continues to rely 
on output price regulation but adds in addition regulation of input 
prices, namely the prices incumbent local telephone companies charge 
new entrants for access to unbundled network elements. 
A. One Infrastructure, Several Owners 
We have thus far identified as a natural monopoly any market where it 
is less expensive for demand to be met by one firm than it is for demand 
to be met by some number of competing firms. That is the standard 
definition of natural monopoly, but it is not quite right. A more precise 
variant would state that a natural monopoly exists whenever it is less 
expensive for demand to be met using a single infrastructure than it is for 
demand to be met using multiple, uncoordinated infrastructures. To see 
what we mean, and why this point is so important to understanding the 
1996 Act, consider two examples. 
Start with cable television. It is easy to see that cable television likely 
exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly. The main cost incurred in 
providing cable television comes in laying the cable grid. Once that cost 
has been incurred and there are wires running along all the major 
streets, the cost of supplying cable to an additional home is relatively 
small. A single cable grid can typically serve all customers who are will-
ing to pay the marginal cost of cable service, and thus cable television is 
likely a natural monopoly: costs are minimized by having only one cable 
grid in each geographic area. 
Natural monopoly thus implies that there should be only one cable 
infrastructure. It tells us nothing, however, about how many firms 
should own that single infrastructure. Suppose, for example, that two 
firms were ordered to share ownership of a given community’s cable 
grid, with one firm programming fifty channels and a competing firm 
programming a different fifty channels. That sort of competition would 
not be wasteful since there would be no duplication of the natural mo-
nopoly infrastructure. Moreover, it would offer some benefits, for exam-
ple ensuring some diversity in terms of content and viewpoint. It would 
thus be fully consistent to say that cable television exhibits the properties 
of a natural monopoly and that cable regulation should ensure that each 
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community has one cable grid but several firms using that grid to offer 
cable television. 
Consider now a second example, this one drawn from the 1912 Su-
preme Court decision in Terminal Railroad.99 At issue was an organiza-
tion called the Terminal Railroad Association. Jay Gould—one of the 
great figures in late nineteenth century railroading and telegraphy—had 
combined into the Terminal Railroad Association the three main routes 
by which railroads crossed the Mississippi River at St. Louis. These 
were the ferry system run by Wiggins Ferry Company, a bridge called 
Eads Railroad Bridge, and another bridge called the Merchants Bridge. 
The United States challenged the three-way combination under the 
Sherman Act, apparently afraid that competition in the railroad industry 
would suffer in a world where a single entity controlled every plausible 
means for crossing the Mississippi at St. Louis.  
The government’s case was not particularly strong, as there was no 
obvious discrimination by the railroad association in favor of insiders 
and against outsiders. That is, Gould’s railroads used the terminal facili-
ties on the same terms that non-affiliated railroads used the facilities. Of 
course, given our concern about monopoly pricing, that could just mean 
that all of the railroads were being gouged by the terminal association. 
But the association was operated on a non-profit basis, just covering 
costs and never paying dividends, and so it seems unlikely that monop-
oly prices were being charged.100 The terminal association had also ex-
panded over time—moving from six members to fourteen—turning out-
siders into insiders and thus further undermining any claim that Gould 
was using his position to favor his own railroads over competing ones.  
The Court saw much of this, recognizing that there was no real 
problem with respect to equal access—at least, not yet—and also that 
operating the three facilities together had some likely efficiency benefits. 
But the Court still found that Gould had violated the Sherman Act. 
The problem was not unequal access. It was unequal ownership. This is 
                                                       
99 United States v Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St Louis, 224 US 383 (1912). 
100 This is somewhat tricky, as the Court recognized. Understanding who was making money 
on nineteenth century railroads requires close tracking of the cash. You might lose money on 
the railroad proper and make it up by owning the construction company doing the building. In 
Terminal Railroad itself, it is possible that Gould and his compatriots were making money from 
the bonds of the association rather than the stock. See id at 401. 
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apparent from the Court’s ultimate remedy. The Court did not require 
that the three means for crossing the river be operated separately. In-
stead, the Court simply required that Gould offer all existing and future 
railroads the opportunity to join his Terminal Railroad Association on 
“just and reasonable terms.”101 This would make the terminal associa-
tion “the agent of all” and would legitimate Gould’s unification of the 
facilities.102 
We can quibble with this result. For instance, it is far from obvious 
that the Court’s solution actually accomplished anything. Prior to its 
ruling, fourteen insiders made decisions for the group of twenty-four 
users, and ten outsiders had no say. After the ruling, if internal decisions 
are made by majority vote, the same fourteen can continue to set policy. 
It is true that if there were direct benefits flowing to the owners as 
such—returns on equity—those presumably would have to be shared 
with the now larger group, but there is nothing in the case to suggest 
that special returns were flowing to the equity holders. But the big pic-
ture here is that the concern in this case was not the existence of a single 
infrastructure for crossing the Mississippi, but was instead the fact that 
the single infrastructure was controlled by a single entity, namely 
Gould’s Terminal Railroad Association. 
How does all this tie into the 1996 Act? Prior to the 1996 Act, local 
telephone regulation had proceeded under the implicit assumption that, 
if there was going to be only one local telecommunications network, it 
should be owned and operated by only one local telecommunications 
firm. The 1996 Act rejects that assumption, following the lesson of 
Terminal Railroad and thus opting for what is in essence shared owner-
ship of the local network. It is possible that, years from now, there will 
still be only one infrastructure. But, even if that happens, under the 
1996 Act there will at least be competition over the use of that infra-
structure. Any firm can use the shared infrastructure to offer its own 
unique mix of services and products, and each firm can add to that 
shared infrastructure its own additional proprietary elements. Rejection 
of the old approach—one infrastructure, one firm, one array of product 
                                                       
101 Id at 411. 
102 Id at 405. 
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offerings—is thus the first significant difference between telephone 
regulation before and after 1996. 
B. Natural Monopoly and the Quarantine 
Now for the second big change: from a regime where the entire local 
market was regulated as a cohesive whole to a regime where regulations 
attempt to target more narrowly specific network elements. Start in the 
pre-1996 Act world. Even though a would-be entrant had no right to 
enter the market, potential entrants did have a strong incentive to inno-
vate with respect to local telephone infrastructure, products, and ser-
vices. After all, if an entrant were to come up with some new innova-
tion—say, caller ID—the incumbent might want to purchase it, since in 
the incumbent’s hands the new technology could be lucrative. Granted, 
the incumbent would likely be somewhat miserly in the negotiation, 
knowing that the entrant has few other potential buyers. At the same 
time, however, the incumbent would not want to be too miserly, since a 
reputation for paying well would encourage other entrants to develop 
new technologies, and those technologies might also be profitable in the 
incumbent’s hands. Voluntary transactions, then, themselves created a 
real incentive for would-be entrants to innovate, even prior to the 1996 
Act. 
So why did Congress intervene? Mainly because those voluntary 
transactions served to benefit the incumbent at the expense of both con-
sumers and the entrant. Focus first on consumers. Prior to the 1996 Act, 
an incumbent might purchase new technologies, yes, but it would not 
share its monopoly position with another firm. So while consumers did 
enjoy some benefit from innovation in terms of getting access to new 
products and services, consumers did not get one important possible 
benefit: competition. If entrants had been allowed to use their innova-
tions to enter the market, by contrast, innovation would have meant new 
products and also lower prices. Now turn to the entrants. If a would-be 
entrant came up with a new technology that created $200 in value, the 
entrant would not keep the full $200. It would keep some, sure; but the 
incumbent would capture some of that upside as well, since without that 
there would be no reason for the incumbent to purchase the invention. 
Thus entrants earned less of a reward—and therefore had less of an in-
centive to innovate—than they might have otherwise had. 
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Now consider the world after the 1996 Act. Entrants who develop 
new infrastructure, products, or services can enter the market without 
the incumbent’s permission. The entrant might have to pay a regulated 
fee to the incumbent for access to some UNEs; but, beyond that, the 
entrant is free to use any new invention to compete with the incumbent. 
That might mean that the entrant will earn more from its innovation 
than it did under prior law, since this time the returns are not shared 
with the incumbent. Or it might mean that the entrant earns less, since 
competition between the incumbent and the entrant might drive prices 
down. But, either way, the benefits of innovation now go to either the 
entrant/innovator or consumers, instead of going in large proportion to 
the incumbent. 
Interestingly, the entrant’s incentive to innovate might be even 
greater than the above analysis suggests. To see why, think about infe-
rior technology. In the pre-1996 Act world, an entrant who came up 
with some inferior technology had nothing to offer. There was no point 
in reaching out to the incumbent and asking about a deal; the incum-
bent was not interested in buying technology that was inferior to its 
own. For the entrant, this meant that investments in research paid off 
only if the result was an actual improvement over existing technology. 
Now jump to the world made possible by the 1996 Act. In this world, 
an entrant who develops a technology superior to the incumbent’s clearly 
has something of value. The entrant can sell it to the incumbent, or the 
entrant can use it to enter the market. But—and here is the interesting 
part—an entrant who develops an inferior technology can also in certain 
settings enter the market. Yes, the incumbent will have a better product 
or lower costs; but the entrant might still be able to compete, for exam-
ple if market prices are far enough above both the incumbent’s and the 
entrant’s total marginal costs. This artificially increases the entrant’s in-
centive to engage in research. Whereas before the only good outcomes 
to research were ones where the resulting technology was superior to the 
incumbent’s technology, now the entrant can benefit both when research 
“succeeds” and, albeit to a lesser extent, even when research “fails.” 
So far, we have focused on reasons why the approach to natural mo-
nopoly under the 1996 Act is an improvement over prior law. But there 
are obviously drawbacks, too. Consider, for instance, the difficulties that 
will arise every time the incumbent decides to change some basic ele-
ment of the telephone network. If the incumbent owned the entire net-
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work—UNEs plus all other components—it could coordinate change. It 
would have a sense of the full system-wide costs and benefits associated 
with any upgrade, and it would be able implement any desirable upgrade 
in a consistent manner. If components of the network are separately 
owned, by contrast, change becomes more difficult. A company that 
sells only end-user equipment, for example, will fight tooth and nail 
against any network change that might decrease the value of its equip-
ment, regardless of the overall costs and benefits to the system.103 Even 
if that firm were to agree to a change, the costs of passing information 
and otherwise coordinating an improvement would certainly be higher. 
In short, bifurcated ownership creates bifurcated information and incen-
tives; and there is something to be said for a market structure where, 
instead, the telephone network is maintained and analyzed as a coherent 
whole. 
C. Natural Monopoly, Input Prices, and Output Prices 
The third big change—in essence, the introduction of network element 
pricing—is in many ways just a necessary ramification of the second. 
That is, given that the 1996 Act regulates UNE by UNE instead of 
lumping together the entire local telephone infrastructure, the govern-
ment had to set prices for UNEs. This is actually the link between Iowa 
Utilities and Verizon. Iowa Utilities is a fight over the scope of access; 
Verizon is a challenge to the pricing rules that will apply however the 
access issue shakes out. For better or worse, then, regulating “input” 
prices was foreordained, at least if the narrower quarantine was going to 
be meaningfully accomplished.  
That said, there is no reason to either celebrate or lament this 
change. Regulating input prices does not seem likely to be substantially 
harder or easier than regulating output prices; both, it turns out, are 
complicated and difficult to accomplish. The first problem is informa-
tion. In United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph,104 the govern-
ment argued that one reason to break up the then-dominant Bell Tele-
                                                       
103 But see In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 2d 420, 
424 (1968) (rejecting this same argument in a dispute over whether telephone handsets had to 
be approved by the telephone company or could instead be supplied competitively). 
104 552 F Supp 131 (DC Cir 1982). 
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phone Company was that it was impossible for the government to regu-
late Bell effectively. Bell had all the information about the costs of pro-
viding various telephone services. The government was thus in the un-
comfortable situation of setting policy and prices based on information 
provided by the very firm it was trying to regulate. Worse, the govern-
ment argued that Bell would intentionally keep itself in the dark about 
some information, not gathering it so as to ensure that the government 
could not use that information against Bell in regulatory proceedings. 
The resulting argument was thus not the conventional claim that a mo-
nopolist was pricing excessively above cost or even predatorily below 
cost; the government’s claim was that Bell was pricing without regard to 
cost, and the government did not know enough about costs to intervene 
effectively.105 That problem to some extent continues today, and it 
seems to apply equally to both input and output prices. 
A second and more significant problem stems from the complicated 
relationship between prices and innovation incentives. If price regulation 
were merely designed to keep prices low, regulation would be relatively 
straightforward; the government can gather good information about 
consumers’ willingness to pay for various telecom services, and the gov-
ernment would therefore be able to adopt relatively effective, aggressive 
pricing measures if the only goal were to ensure that most consumers 
can afford most telephone services. But the goal of price regulation is 
significantly more complicated, as it is designed not only to keep prices 
low for existing services but also to encourage firms to maintain quality, 
minimize costs, and invest in new infrastructure. Accomplishing all that 
is no easy task, even if price regulation just focuses on the output mar-
ket. 
Take one example: price cap regulation. Under this approach, the 
government announces a maximum price that can be charged for some 
service and further specifies how that price will change over time to ac-
count for expected efficiency gains, inflation, and so on. The idea is to 
give the regulated party a strong incentive to minimize costs. If the 
regulated firm can lower its costs, it can keep the extra profits for itself. 
The government, meanwhile, can regulate in this fashion even without 
                                                       
105 Roger Noll and Bruce Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v 
AT&T, in J. Kwoka and L. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution 290, 295-326 (Scott, 1989). 
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knowing very much about the regulated firm’s cost structure. The gov-
ernment just sets a price that seems reasonable given past prices and ex-
pected consumer demand, and the rest takes care of itself. 
So far, so good. In practice, however, there are problems. First, 
price cap regulation tempts firms to slash costs not only by increasing 
efficiency but also by skimping on quality. That is, there are two ways to 
increase profits under a price cap: one is to provide the same service at 
lower cost, but the other is to provide worse service. Price cap regulation 
might therefore ironically encourage firms to offer cheap, low-quality 
service instead of more expensive, higher quality service. Second, be-
cause the government cannot credibly commit not to change the price 
cap, the incentive to lower costs is in fact significantly weaker than at 
first appears. If the regulated firm does a great job at cutting costs, there 
is some chance that the government will renege on the deal and lower 
the price cap. A regulated firm making a large profit and charging high 
prices is just too easy a target.106 Conversely, if the regulated firm sees 
its costs skyrocket, it is likely that the government will bail the firm out 
by raising the price cap instead of, say, allowing the lone local telephone 
provider to go bankrupt. Both of these responses undermine the incen-
tive to cut costs. The upside to cost reductions is reduced since the gov-
ernment might recapture some of that savings for consumers, and the 
downside to waste is also reduced since the government might allow the 
firm to raise its prices if costs are overwhelming revenue. 
Moreover, the details of the price cap regime alter these dynamics in 
important ways. Consider again the possibility that firms will make “too 
much” money under a price cap regime and that regulators will seek to 
re-cut the deal afterwards. Individual firms would anticipate that and 
would seek to avoid “excess” profits by spending more excessively. This 
might lead to nice cars for firm executives, fancy offices, and so on. But 
the incentive of individual firms to pull back on the profits throttle de-
pends critically on whether the regulator sets policy at the firm level or 
the industry level. If the price cap is altered at the firm level, the dynam-
                                                       
106 To see the enormous instability associated with price cap regulation in practice, consider 
the cases on price cap regulation as it applied to the interstate services of local telephone ex-
change companies: US Telephone Ass’n v FCC, 188 F3d 521 (DC Cir 1999); Bell Atlantic Tele-
phone Companies v FCC, 79 F3d 1195 (DC Cir 1996); and National Rural Telecom Association v 
FCC, 988 F2d 174 (DC Cir 1993). 
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ics play out as we have indicated. If instead the price cap is based on 
overall industry profits, individual firms may lack the incentive to cut 
back. The firms in the industry face a collective action problem: their 
individual decisions matter only at the margin for the industry outcome, 
and, given that, they may as well make as much money as they can. Do-
ing that, however, ends up hurting them all, because the regulator will 
see those profits and react accordingly. 
Overall, the point here is simply that price regulation is complicated 
even when applied to outputs. It is therefore not the case that the 1996 
Act moves regulation away from a type of regulation that has been very 
successful and towards one that is more precarious. Price regulation is 
difficult no matter whether it applies to inputs or outputs, mainly be-
cause both require the government to make educated guesses about costs 
and incentives, two things about which the government understandably 
knows very little. The main policy concern, then, might just be transi-
tion costs. That is, the strongest argument against the new pricing re-
gime might simply be the cost of designing—and litigating over—a new 
system. Beyond that, price regulation for inputs presents different com-
plexities than those already familiar under price regulation for outputs, 
but there is no reason to think that the one is any more difficult than the 
other. 
IV. The State of Entry in Local Telecommunications 
We have covered a great deal of theory; it is thus here a good time to 
pause and look at practical consequences, specifically some data relating 
to the state of entry in local telecommunications. When a good business 
can be made out of melting down millions of dollars in redundant tele-
communications equipment to recover precious metals,107 we know that 
serious mistakes have been made, though not necessarily that we could 
have done any better. And so let us ask: what has entry looked like in 
local telecommunications? Has the 1996 Act resulted in overinvestment 
                                                       
107 See Dan Roberts, Glorious Hopes on a Trillion-Dollar Scrapheap, Financial Times (Sept. 5, 
2001). For more detail, visit the Shields Environmental website at  <http://www.shields-
e.com> (visited November 1, 2002). 
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in local telecommunications, underinvestment, or in Goldilocks fashion, 
did it get it just right? 
As of December, 1999—roughly three years after the 1996 Act 
went into effect—CLECs held roughly 4.3% of the market in end-user 
switched access lines.108 By June 30, 2002, total lines had drifted down 
slightly from roughly 189.5 million to 189.1 million, after peaking at 
192.6 million at the end of 2000. Since December 1999, CLEC market 
share has grown steadily, reaching 11.4% as of June 30, 2002. This entry 
disproportionately targets medium and large businesses, institutions and 
the government. As of mid-year 2002, incumbents had 78.3% of their 
lines with residential and small business customers, while CLECs had 
only 51.2% of their lines with these end-users.109 
Of the roughly 21.6 million CLEC lines with end-users as of mid-
2002, 28.8%, or about 6.2 million, were CLEC owned; 50.5%, or about 
10.9 million, were provided through UNE access; and 20.7%, or about 
4.5 million were provided through the resale provisions of the Act. The 
resale provisions, as you might recall, basically mean that the entrant is 
buying service from the incumbent at regulated, wholesale rates and 
then re-branding it for sale to end-users. Between December 1999 and 
June 2002, the number of CLEC-owned lines more than doubled, but 
actually dropped as a percentage of the total number of CLEC end-user 
lines (from 33.2% to 28.8%).110 
From the perspective of the incumbents, the direct burden of 
CLEC access is growing. The number of resold lines purchased by 
CLECs rose from roughly 1.7 million in December 1997 to 5.4 million 
in December 2000 and then fell to 3.5 million as of June 2002.111 This 
suggests that resale has become relatively less attractive. UNE access, 
                                                       
108 See FCC, Industry Analysis Division, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 
2002 at Table 1 (2002) (available online at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Com-
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109 Id at Table 2. 
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111 For those reading carefully, note that as of June 2002, while CLECs resell 3.5 million lines 
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reflects lines resold from sources other than ILECs. 
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meanwhile, is growing rapidly. CLECs have gone from 133,000 UNE-
accessed lines in December 1997 to 1.5 million in December 1999 to 
11.5 million in June 2002. Still, the overall presence of CLECs on 
ILEC premises is small: only 8.3% of all ILEC lines were being either 
resold or accessed under the UNE provisions as of June, 2002.112 
Not only is CLEC entry targeted on heavy users—large businesses 
and the government—but, unsurprisingly, it focuses on dense popula-
tion areas. As of June 2002, 33% of US zip codes had no CLECs and 
another 19.5% had only one. Only 6.6% of US households actually live 
in the zip codes without a CLEC, however, and another 9.1% of US 
households live in zip codes with only a single CLEC entrant.113 This is 
somewhat interesting, as it offers some sense of the costs of entry. Re-
member that CLECs were using their own lines only 29% of the time as 
of June 2002, though, to be sure, they could have been using some of 
their own facilities in conjunction with ILEC lines in the other 71% of 
the cases. Still, the CLECs are not choosing to enter rural areas using 
just the ILEC’s equipment, even though they obviously do a fair amount 
of this in densely-populated areas. This suggests that some costs, such as 
advertising costs and other brand-building expenditures, are best spread 
over dense areas and that these costs are important in explaining the 
pattern of CLEC entry. 
In sum, after nearly seven years under the 1996 Act, CLECs have 
about 11% of the end-user lines market, and, of that, roughly 71% of the 
lines are owned by other carriers. Put differently, at least over the so-
called last mile, CLECs provide service over their own lines for only 3% 
of the market. The 7% of the market covered by CLECs using the lines 
of others should be counted as at least a partial success for the Act, as in 
some of those situations, the CLEC may be using some of its own fa-
cilities to provide telecommunications service. 
All of this confirms what we instinctively knew, namely that the real 
hot spot for consumers is not landlines, but cell phones. The competi-
tion in local markets that was to come from CLECs really seems instead 
to be coming through wireless. Mobile wireless telephone subscribers 
have jumped from roughly 79.7 million in December 1999 to 128.8 mil-
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lion in June 2002.114 In that same period, end-user switched access 
landlines declined slightly, dropping from 189.5 million to 189.1 mil-
lion. That looks like a declining market, especially as measured against 
the December 2000 peak of 192.6 million lines. Market shares have 
moved around during that period: CLECs added about 13.4 million 
lines and ILECs lost about 13.8 million lines. But, obviously, the major 
action is in cell phones, where carriers added 49.1 million cell phone 
users during the same period.115 Now lines are a crude measure; we 
might care more about market share as defined by the number of min-
utes used—that would be true for evaluating CLECs as well—but in-
dustry analysts believe that as many as 10 million landlines have been 
displaced by wireless lines.116 
What do these numbers mean for our questions? We said before 
that we cannot assess how competitive a market is by the number of par-
ticipants, so the fact that CLECs have an 11% market share tells us 
nothing directly. The threat of entry itself might be significantly altering 
incumbent incentives and market prices. Similarly, the fact that many 
CLECs have entered and failed—more than 50 CLECs are reported to 
have filed for bankruptcy117—does not tell us much either. It would 
make no more sense to say that a drug company wasted the first ninety-
nine petri dishes when it turned out that the new blockbuster drug was 
in the hundredth dish. The nature of research and development is sub-
stantial failure, and failure alone cannot be seen as equivalent to waste. 
What of missing investment? It is almost impossible to quantify the ex-
tent to which incumbents may have been discouraged from either mak-
ing new investments or repairing old investments, just as it is hard to 
quantify how much new research is being done by entrants. It might also 
be somewhat unfair to evaluate any of these numbers at this stage, since 
entry and competition in the local market have throughout this period 
taken place under the shadow of considerable legal uncertainty. That 
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uncertainty has been partially diminished, but as we will explain below, 
even now there are clouds on the horizon. 
V. Conclusion 
The data presented in the previous section offer at least a partial answer 
to the question of what the 1996 Act has actually accomplished thus far. 
Here, let us conclude by asking the same question about the Court: 
namely, after millions of dollars and several years of litigation, what have 
the Court decisions in Iowa Utilities and Verizon actually accomplished? 
The Court in Iowa Utilities accomplished a great deal, in that the 
opinion both resolved many of the jurisdictional issues related to the 
implementation of the Act and forced the Commission to more care-
fully articulate its understanding of the unbundled network element re-
gime. Results followed quickly. In 1999, the Commission released new 
regulations specifically designed to respond to the Court’s objections. 
These new regulations “take into consideration alternatives outside the 
[incumbent’s] network” and also consider “whether those alternatives are 
actually available to the requesting carrier as a practical, economic, and 
operational matter.”118 The new regulations unbundle only in instances 
where a “lack of access” to the requested element “materially diminishes 
a requesting carrier’s ability to provide the services it seeks to offer”119 
and they emphasize in addition five relevant factors: the rapid introduc-
tion of competition in all markets; the deployment of new telecommuni-
cations infrastructure; reduced regulation; certainty in the marketplace; 
and administrative practicality.120 In short, the new regulations respond 
to all of the issues raised in Iowa Utilities. 
Unfortunately, things have not gone well from there. In May 2002, 
the DC Circuit vacated the Commission’s revised regulations.121 The 
problem this time was that, except for two elements, the Commission’s 
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rules applied “uniformly to all elements in every geographic or customer 
market.”122 The D.C. Circuit found this inadequately justified, with the 
court wondering why differences between the various markets—the 
court’s main example is differences in state regulations, though there are 
obviously economic differences as well—were not being accounted for in 
the unbundling rules. Interestingly, this question mirrors one of the core 
issues raised in Iowa Utilities, namely whether the Commission’s rules 
have to account for the possibility of voluntary market transactions. The 
similarity is that, in both instances, the basic dispute is over the extent to 
which unbundling rules need to be sensitive to actual market conditions; 
the Supreme Court wanted more sensitivity to the scope of available 
voluntary transactions and self-provisioning, while the D.C. Circuit now 
wants more sensitivity to any differences in each state's economic and 
legal terrain. 
In any event, the Commission is as of this writing back at work on 
its rules. This is unfortunate in the sense that these continued iterations 
have prolonged the process of implementing the 1996 Act and have in-
creased the underlying legal uncertainty, two effects that have likely re-
duced overall investment in the local telecommunications market. But it 
would be unreasonable to expect that the Court would anticipate all 
possible interpretive issues related to the “necessary” and “impair” stan-
dard, and so it is hard to fault the Court for not spotting this issue back 
in Iowa Utilities. 
As for Verizon, the Court did resolve the dispute over TELRIC, 
thus paving the way for the Commission’s pricing methodology to be 
implemented in the states. Feedback from that process should help the 
Commission adjust its methodology to better serve the goals of the 1996 
Act, and of course implementation at the state level is the next big step 
in terms of bringing the 1996 Act into full effect. Our concerns with 
respect to the Takings Clause, by contrast, were left largely unresolved. 
As we have pointed out, that is unfortunate; delaying the takings analy-
sis likely means that the Takings Clause cannot serve what would have 
been a valuable purpose, namely allowing the Commission to address 
separately the distributional and efficiency issues implicated by access 
pricing. 
                                                       
122 Id at 419. 
Lichtman & Picker Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications 54 
 
Ironically, then, while Iowa Utilities will for the next many years be 
an important window through which regulators and industry partici-
pants will understand and evaluate both the 1996 Act and access rules 
more generally, it is possible that Verizon is destined to quickly become a 
footnote in the history of telecommunications regulation. The case 
seems likely to have legs, if at all, as part of Takings Clause jurispru-
dence—not yet, and not for what it says or does, but for what it failed to 
do and for the series of events implicitly put into motion by virtue of the 
Court’s decision to postpone the takings issue. 
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